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ABSTRACT
Recognition memory refers to a person’s ability to recognize something that has
been previously encountered. For several decades recognition memory has been
thought to be governed by a single process whereby the strength of a memory for
an item dictates whether people judge the item as having been previously encoun-
tered or not. More recently, it has been proposed that recognition memory is governed
by two, independent processes: Sometimes a memory judgement is based on strength,
sometimes it is based on explicit recollection. Whereas this two-process theory has
been embraced by many researchers, others claim that only one process is necessary
to explain recognition memory. Here, I argue that all previous evidence for both the
one and the two-process theories is questionable — because all models of recognition
memory are non-linear models, averaging data over factors that vary (e.g., items)
will distort the conclusions drawn. In all previous work it has been necessary to
average data over items in order to fit formal models. To avoid the distortions from
averaging, I develop hierarchical versions of popular recognition memory models that
simultaneously account for person and item variability. These models are fit to data
from several experiments to assess the veracity of previous claims. The results of this
hierarchical modeling suggest that 1) ROC asymmetry, which has served as strong
evidence for particular one and two-process model, is not an artifact of averaging, 2)
The Yonelinas two-process model provides a superior account of recognition memory
data when compared with the unequal-variance signal detection model via the DIC
model-fit statistic, and 3) Two-process model fits reveal that estimates of recollec-
tion and familiarity co-vary across items and people. Moreover, manipulations of
depth-of-processing, perceptual match-mismatch, response deadline, and list length
all affect both recollection and familiarity to some degree. This result implies that,
although the two-process model is the best-fitting parametric model, the data are
x
being generated from a yet-to-be specified one-process model.
xi
Chapter 1
Introduction
The study of human memory has enjoyed a long and rich history in psychology.
Recently, a large effort has been made to better understand the processes underly-
ing recognition memory including representations of memory (Eich, 1982; Hintzman,
1984; Humphreys, Pike, Bain, & Tehan, 1989; Murdock, 1982), how recognition judg-
ments are made (Glanzer & Adams, 1990; Morrell, Gaitan, & Wixted, 2002), and
whether there are one or multiple memory processes (Wixted, 2007; Yonelinas &
Parks, 2007). Testing whether there are one or multiple processes is becoming espe-
cially important, as dual process models are being utilized to understand deficits in
memory due to various psychopathologies including Alzheimer’s disease (Bennett,
Golob, Parker, & Starr, 2006), Parkinson’s disease (Davidson, Anaki, Saint-Cyr,
Chow, & Moscovitch, 2006), schizophrenia (Brebion, David, Jones, & Pilowsky, 2005;
Linscott & Knight, 2001), depression (Channon, Baker, & Robertson, 1993) and am-
nesia (Yonelinas, Kroll, Dobbins, Lazzara, & Knight, 1998), and healthy aging (Dase-
laar, Fleck, Dobbins, Madden, & Cabeza, 2006; Prull, Dawes, Martin, Rosenberg, &
Light, 2006).
In science, it is critically important to understand how data may be used to test
and constrain theory. In this dissertation, I argue that the link between theory and
1
data in the study of recognition memory processing is tenuous. The heart of this
critique is that researchers must currently average recognition memory data over
participants or items in order to evaluate competing theories. Often, these theories
make fairly similar predictions about data patterns. I show that biases from averaging,
even small ones, can provide spurious evidence for certain theoretical positions.
To avoid these misleading effects of averaging, models must explicitly account for
variability from design elements such as the selection of participants and items. I
construct several such models; some of these are classic recognition memory models
that I extend to account for variability due to participants and the items that are
studied, and some are novel theoretical developments. These models are then applied
to new experiments in order to test benchmark results that have been based on fitting
models to averaged data.
1.1 Averaging Data In Non-linear Models
Most models of cognitive processes are non-linear models — the mapping between
the parameter space and the data is some nonlinear function. To demonstrate the
effect of averaging data in such nonlinear models, let θ1 and θ2 be model parameters
for two participants, let f(θ) be some nonlinear function that maps θ to the data
space for both participants, and let X1 and X2 be the resulting observations for each
participant. Note that the observations are generated from f(θ) without adding any
noise; the only variance in the observations results from variance between participants.
Ideally, the data for each participant would be used to recover the parameters for each
participant separately. If f−1(X) is the inverse function that maps data back into
parameter space, then the separate estimates θˆ1 = f
−1(X1) and θˆ2 = f−1(X2) are
accurate. Moreover,
θ1 + θ2
2
=
f−1(X1) + f−1(X2)
2
,
2
that is, the average of the estimated parameters is the average of the true parameters.
In may cases, however, data are too sparse to estimate parameters for each partic-
ipant separately, and so the data are averaged across participants and the averaged
data are used to recover what is thought to be the averaged parameter values:
X¯ =
X1 +X2
2
,
θ¯ = f−1(X¯),
θ¯ 6= θ1 + θ2
2
.
As a concrete example, let the function that maps parameters to data be f(θ) =
√
θ,
and so the inverse function mapping the data back to parameters is f−1(X) = X2.
Clearly, when data are not averaged parameters are recovered:
X1 =
√
θ1,
X2 =
√
θ2,
θˆ1 = X
2
1 =
(√
θ1
)2
= θ1,
θˆ2 = X
2
2 =
(√
θ2
)2
= θ2.
When the data are averaged, however, the parameter recovered from the averaged
data is not the average of the true parameters:
X¯ =
√
θ1 +
√
θ2
2
,
θˆ = X¯2 =
(√
θ1 +
√
θ2
2
)2
,
θˆ 6=
(√
θ1
)2
+
(√
θ2
)2
2
. (1.1)
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Although this inequality is obvious, it is overlooked every time data are averaged
across factors that vary in their parameters (e.g., participants or items). Moreover,
in this example the distortions due to averaging are present even in the absence of any
random noise included in the function mapping parameters to data. These distortions
are, therefore, asymptotic: They will occur regardless of how much data are collected.
Because the function mapping parameters to data is non-linear, the magnitude
and nature of the distortion resulting from averaging over participants depends on
the values of the true parameters. In the above example, this simply means that the
size of the difference between the left and right sides of the inequality in Equation 1.1
depends on the values of θ1 and θ2. In real analysis, true values are of course not
known. The result is that the distortions due to averaging can not, for example, be
estimated and accounted for with some correction. The only solution to avoiding
them is to avoid averaging over things that vary, such as participants and items.
Unfortunately, as the following examples show, doing so is not always easy.
1.1.1 An Example of Averaging in Learning
The consequences of averaging data can be seen clearly when learning curves are
averaged across participants. The following seminal example is from Estes (1956).
Consider an experiment in which participants are asked to repetitively perform a
task, and learning is measured as decreases in reaction time across trials. Our goal is
to determine whether learning is a discrete process (i.e., occurs all in one trial) or is
continuous, occurring gradually across trials. Figure 1.1 shows hypothetical data in
which each participant exhibits all-or-none learning, but the point at which learning
occurs varies across participants. The learning curve constructed by averaging across
participants (black line), however, clearly suggest that learning is gradual.
The effects of averaging data have also been explored within the context of pro-
cess dissociation (Curran & Hintzman, 1995; Rouder, Lu, Morey, Sun, & Speckman,
4
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Figure 1.1: The effect of averaging learning curves over people. Grey lines are reaction
times for individuals across trials — each individual exhibits discrete learning but each
learns at different rates. The black line is the averaged learning curve, which clearly
suggests gradual learning.
2008) and two-choice signal detection (Rouder & Lu, 2005; Rouder et al., 2007). Be-
fore exploring the consequences of averaging recognition memory data, I present the
recognition memory paradigm and competing models.
1.2 Recognition Memory Data
There are several variants of the recognition memory paradigm. Here I consider the
tasks and resulting data that are most often used to compare competing recognition
memory models.
1.2.1 Old-New Recognition
Recognition memory tasks usually consist of a study phase, a retention interval, and a
test phase. During study, participants are shown a list of items and asked to remember
them for a later test. Items are most often words. In some study tasks participants
5
may be instructed to simply read the words. In other tasks, participants may be asked
to perform some task regarding the word, such as counting the number of vowels it
contains. During study, participants are shown both words from the studied phase
and new words that were not studied (one at a time and in a random order). The task
is to decide whether each word is new or was studied. For each trial at study the item
may be new or studied, and the participant may respond new or studied. Responses
are coded as follows: a studied response to a studied item is a hit; a studied response
to a new item is a false alarm. Hits and false alarms completely describe the data;
their compliments (new responses to new and studied items) need not be considered.
Researchers commonly average responses over items to obtain hit and false alarm
rates for each participant. Before considering how this averaging distorts results,
it is useful to consider how these rates are commonly modeled. There are, at a
minimum, two classes of attributes that determine the hit and false alarm rates.
First, participants with high mnemonic abilities will have higher hit rates and/or
lower false alarm rates than participants with poor mnemonic abilities. Second, some
participants may be more biased than others toward a particular response, e.g., one
may respond studied very often regardless of whether items were actually studied or
not. The aim of all formal models is to characterize mnemonic ability and response
bias; the differences between models is how they do so.
Each participant has a hit and false alarm rate that must be predicted by a model.
All models, however, must include at least two parameters (one for mnemonic ability
and one for bias). The result is that any model can perfectly predict the data, and
so comparing the abilities of competing models to describe old-new recognition data
makes little sense. Instead, researchers obtain more complex data, receiver operating
characteristic curves, that may be used to distinguish models.
6
1.2.2 Receiver Operating Characteristic Curves
In order to provide data that can distinguish among models, each participant’s re-
sponse bias can be manipulated systematically using differential payoffs (e.g., $10 per
hit, $2 per correct rejection) or punishment. The resulting variability in hits and false
alarm rates for each participant reflects differences in response biases with constant
mnemonic ability.
These data are commonly presented as receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curves whereby the hit rate for each payoff condition is plotted as a function of that
condition’s false alarm rate. The points in Figure 1.2 show a typically-observed ROC
curve (with 5 payoff conditions). This curve shows two common properties of ROC
curves. First, recognition memory ROCs are not straight lines, but rather exhibit
substantial curvature. Second, ROCs are typically asymmetric about the negative
diagonal, as if the curve were pushed up on the left and pushed down on the right
(In Figure 1.2 the line shows a symmetric curve for comparison). Although this
asymmetry is subtle, it is almost always observed (see Glanzer, Kim, Hilford, &
Adams, 1999; Yonelinas & Parks, 2007, for reviews) and has driven an substantial
body of theoretical development.
1.2.3 Confidence Ratings
Collecting ROC data by manipulating payoffs or punishments is costly as each par-
ticipant must perform several trials at each level of payoff condition. Moreover, the
usefulness of the data relies on participants being sufficiently biased by the payoff
manipulation, which is notoriously difficult to accomplish1. An alternative way to
construct ROC curves is by collecting participant’s confidence in their response that
1We recently gave participants a 10-second ear-wrenching buzzing sound for every false alarm
made, and no punishment for a miss. Whereas this punishment schedule should make any rational
being avoid responding studied unless they were absolutely sure an item was studied, the average
false alarm rate was still 7%!
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Figure 1.2: A typical ROC curve. The points are data from Experiment 1 and
display a typical amount of asymmetry about the negative diagonal. The line is a
hypothetical, symmetric ROC curve for comparison.
an item was new or studied. The most common design includes the six response
options “sure new”, “believe new”, “guess new”, “guess studied”, “believe studied”,
and “sure studied”. Theoretically, the differences between different levels of confi-
dence for a participant reflect different levels of response bias in the same manner
as manipulating payoff structure. Several researchers have constructed ROC curves
from both payoff manipulations and confidence ratings, and find that they have the
same shape (e.g., Egan, 1975; Ratcliff, Sheu, & Grondlund, 1992). This equivalence
has recently been questioned (Broder & Schutz, 2009), however, Experiment 2 in
Chapter 4 provides addition support for it. Most importantly, however, formal mod-
els of memory make clear and sometimes distinct predictions regarding the patters of
confidence-rating data, making them useful.
To demonstrate the construction of ROC curves from confidence rating data, let
K denote the number of response options, Sk denote the proportion of studied-item
trials for which the k ∈ {1, . . . , K} confidence judgement was made, and Nk denote
the same for new-item trials. For example, the proportion of “sure new” responses
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to new items is N1 and that of “sure studied” responses to studied items is SK . The
ratings to new and studied-item trials are transformed to false alarm rates fk and hit
rates hk, respectively, by cumulatively summing them from the “sure studied” rate
to the “sure new” rate as follows:
fk =
K∑
l=K−k+1
Nl, (1.2)
hk =
K∑
l=K−k+1
Sl. (1.3)
The values of fK and hK are always 1.0 and are omitted from ROC plots.
1.3 Models of Recognition Memory
In order to explore the effects of averaging recognition memory data, it is necessary
to consider what models may be generating the data. In this section I provide a gen-
eral overview of three popular models of recognition memory: 1) The equal-variance
signal detection model, 2) The unequal-variance signal detection model, and 3) The
Yonelinas dual-process model.
1.3.1 Equal Variance Signal Detection
According to the theory of signal detection, all recognition judgements are made based
on the strength of a particular memory trace. For example, when you are not sure
which level you parked your car on, but looking at the “orange level” sign you have
a faint feeling that it is on the “orange” level, your recognition is based on a weak
memory. Likewise, if you see the “orange level” sign and are sure that you parked
your car there, then you are experiencing a strong memory. This is a truely elegant
theory of memory — it is termed a single process model as only one process, memory
9
strength, determines your recognition behavior (accuracy, speed, etc.).
On a recognition memory task, signal detection theory posits that each item at test
elicits some amount of memory strength. On a given trial the response is determined
by where the item’s strength lies relative to criteria set by the participant on the
strength axis. The earliest signal detection model proposed to account for recognition
memory data was the equal-variance signal detection (EVSD) model (Green & Swets,
1966; Kintsch, 1967). According to EVSD the latent mnemonic strengths of items
are normally distributed with unit variance. The mean of the strength distribution
is fixed to 0.0 for new items, and is a free parameter denoted d′ for studied items.
In a two-choice task (i.e., respond “new” or “studied”) participants place a single
criterion (denoted C) on the strength axis (see Figure 1.3A). If the strength of an
item is above this criterion the participant responds “studied”; if the strength is
below the criterion the participant responds “new”. According to the model, the
probability of making “new” and “studied” responses to new items equals the area
under the new-item strength distributuion below and above the criterion, respectively.
Likewise, the probability of making “new” and “studied” responses to studied items
is the area below and above criterion under the studied-item distributuion. These
areas are defined by the standard normal cumulative distributuion function (CDF)
Φ(X):
Pr(False Alarm) = Pr(respond studied|new item) = Φ(−C)
Pr(Hit) = Pr(respond studied|studied item) = Φ(d′ − C)
These equations make it clear that signal detection is a non-linear model — the
mapping between parameters (d′ and C) and data (hits and false alarms) is the non-
linear function Φ(X).
Within the EVSD framework parameter d′ measures a participant’s mnemonic
10
ability — larger distances between the new and studied-item distributions means it
is easier to discriminate new from studied items based on their strength values. As
d′ decreases and the distributions overlap, strength values are no longer diagnostic
of whether an item was studied or is new. The criterion measures a participant’s
response biases. For example, a person who is biased to response “studied” will have
a low criterion, reflecting a high probability of both hits and false alarms.
The equal variance signal detection model may be easily extended to account
for confidence ratings data. For K response options, K − 1 criteria denoted Ck.
K = 1, . . . , K−1, are placed on the strength axis (see Figure 1.3B). The probablity of
making a particular confidence response is simply the area under the normal distribu-
tuions between the critiera. Let X be confidence rating data where X ∈ {1, . . . , K}
represents which response was made on a give trial. The mapping between EVSD
parameters and confidence ratings data is as follows:
Pr(X = k|new item) = Φ(Ck)− Φ(Ck−1)
Pr(X = k|studied item) = Φ(d′ − Ck)− Φ(d′ − Ck−1)
where C0 = −∞, and CK = ∞. For example, the probability that the second
response (“believe new”) will be made on a new-item trial is the area under the
standard normal distribution between the first and second criteria. For a studied-
item trial the probability that the Kth response (“sure studied”) will be made is the
area under the normal distribution with mean d′ and variance 1.0 that lies above the
highest (K − 1) criterion. The criteria in this model reflect several characteristics of
participants responses biases. First, if a participant has a strong tendency to make
the second confidence response (“believe new”), then the first and second criteria will
be spread far apart. Second, an overall bias to respond “studied” is reflected by a
concurrent increase in all criteria.
11
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Figure 1.3: Equal variance signal detection model. A. Graphical representation of the
EVSD model for a two-choice task. B. Graphical representation of the EVSD model
for a confidence rating task with 6 response options. The new-item distributuion is
a standard normal, the studied-item distributuion is normal with mean d′ and unit
variance. C. ROC curves from EVSD model for d′ values ranging from .2 to 2.5.
ROC curves are plots of hits (hk) as a function of false alarms (fk). From the
above equations, it can be easily shown that predicted ROCs for EVSD are:
hk = Φ(d
′ − Φ−1(fk)).
where Φ−1 is the standard normal quantile function, and hit and false alarm rates are
derived from confidence ratings per Equations 1.2 and 1.3. Predicted EVSD ROC
curves for several values of d′ are shown in Figure 1.3C. These predicted ROC lines are
curved in a manner consistant with emperical data. The ROCs predicted by EVSD,
however, are symmetric about the negative diagonal. This failure of the EVSD model
to account for ROC asymmetry has motivated two more complex models that can
predict it. These models are extensions of EVSD, discussed in turn below.
1.3.2 Unequal-Variance Signal Detection
The first proposed extension of EVSD that can account for ROC asymmetry is to
allow the variances of the new and studied-item distributuions to differ (Egan, 1975).
This model, termed the unequal-variance signal detection model (UVSD), is identical
12
to EVSD with the exception that the studied-item distributuion has variance denoted
σ2 which is a free parameter (see Figure 1.4A). Predicted response probabilites are
similar to those from EVSD:
Pr(X = k|new item) = Φ(Ck)− Φ(Ck−1)
Pr(X = k|studied item) = Φ
(
d′ − Ck
σ
)
− Φ
(
d′ − Ck−1
σ
)
From these equations the predicted UVSD ROC curve is:
hk = Φ
(
d′ − Φ−1(fk)
σ
)
Predicted UVSD ROC curves for two values of σ2 are shown in Figure 1.4B. As can be
seen, the amount of asymmetry and σ2 are positively related: the greater the variance
in studied-item strength, the greater the ROC asymmetry. If σ2 = 1.0 then UVSD
reduces to EVSD, and thus predicts symmetric ROC curves. Figure 1.4C shows ROC
data from a confidence ratings task, and the predicted ROC curve from EVSD and
UVSD models. Although the difference (i.e., symmetry vs. asymmetry) is small, in
almost every fit to data the value of σ2 is found to be significantly greater than 1.0
(see Glanzer et al., 1999; Wixted, 2007; Yonelinas & Parks, 2007, for reviews).
The UVSD model has one more parameter, σ2, than EVSD. Although this ad-
dition successfully predicts ROC asymmetry, it also comes with several undesireable
consequences. The most important consequence is that the loss of parsimony over
EVSD is great considering only one parameter has been added. This loss is even
greater is ROC curves across conditions and people don’t share the same value of
σ2. In fact, there is substantial evidence that σ2 varies across conditions (Glanzer et
al., 1999). As a result, predicted ROC curves from UVSD vary in both d′ and σ2.
Figure 1.5 shows some such predictions for values of d′ and σ2 that were generated
randomly. Contrasting these with the predictions of EVSD (Figure 1.3C) clearly
13
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Figure 1.4: Unequal variance signal detection model. A. Graphical representation
of the UVSD model for a confidence rating task with 6 response options. The new-
item distributuion is a standard normal, the studied-item distributuion is normal
with mean d′ and variance σ2. B. ROC curves from UVSD model with two different
values of σ2. C. ROC data from a confidence ratings task and predictions from the
best-fitting EVSD and UVSD models.
shows the effect of adding only one extra pamameter in UVSD. Nonetheless, the
UVSD model is considered a single-process model as responses are determined solely
by mnemnoic strength.
1.3.3 Yonelinas’ Dual-Process Model
Single-process signal-detection models provided the foundation for recognition mem-
ory research for nearly 30 years. During this time, however, a growing body of evi-
dence from other memory domains suggested that memory could only be described
by two independent processes. For example, patients with extensive damage to the
hippocampus exhibit an inability to form new memories (termed anterograde amne-
sia). One morning, Dr. Clapare`de (1911) unwittingly stabbed one of these patients
with a needle during their routine morning handshake. The following morning, the
patient did not remember ever meeting Dr. Clapare`de, however, the patient refused
to shake his hand. The reason for the refusal was not that he been stabbed the previ-
ous morning, but rather, the patient made up fabricated reasons (e.g., fear of germs,
hatred of doctors, etc.). These and similar findings lead researchers to conclude that
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Figure 1.5: The loss of parsimony in UVSD. ROC curves were generated from the
UVSD model with values of d′ and σ2 were chosen from a Uniform(0,3).
memory is divided into two separate systems: an explicit ,conscious system, and an
implicit ,unconscious system.
Yonelinas (1994) proposed a two-process model account of recognition memory
confidence-ratings data. According to this dual-process signal detection (DPSD)
model, recognition judgments result from one of two independent processes. Some-
times, people have explicit, conscious recollection of an item. When this conscious
recollection of a studied item occurs in a confidence-ratings task, the participant will
always response “sure studied”. Sometimes, however, conscious recollection may fail.
When it does, responses are assumed to arise from implicity familiarity which is mod-
eled as an equal-variance signal detection process. A graphical representation of this
model is shown in Figure 1.6A. For studied items explicit recollection is an all-or-none
process that occurs with probability R. If recollection fails, judgments are made based
on implicit familiarity values arising from a normal distribution with mean d′ relative
to criteria Ck. Judgments about new items are based solely on familiarity that arises
from a standard normal distribution. The mapping between DPSD parameters and
15
confidence ratings data is as follows:
Pr(X = k| new) = Φ (Ck)− Φ
(
Ci(k−1)
)
,
Pr(X = k ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1}| studied) = (1−R) [Φ (d′ − Ck)− Φ (d′ − C(k−1))] ,
Pr(X = K| studied) = R + (1−R) Φ (C(K−1) − d′) ,
The ROC curve predicted by the DPSD model is:
hk = R + (1−R) ∗ Φ(d′ − Φ−1(fk)).
The probability of recollection serves as a y-intercept for the ROC curve, and the
remainder of the curve is traced out as it is in the equal-variance signal detection
model. Figure 1.6B shows predicted ROC curves for two levels of recollection. The
amount of explicit recollection is positively related to ROC asymmetry: the more
recollection, the more asymmetry. When recollection is absent (R = 0) DPSD reduces
to an equal-variance signal detection model. Thus, values of R > 0 index the extent
to which the ROC curve deviates from symmetry. This relationship is similar to that
between asymmetry and σ2 in the UVSD model. The difference is that the dual-
process model posits that the amount of ROC asymmetry provides a direct measure
of explicit recollection.
The dual-process model of recognition memory has been used to examine deficits
in memory, with claims often that a deficit affects one or the other process, or both.
Nevertheless, many theorists conclude that recognition memory is mediated by a sin-
gle process, and that these researchers are incorrectly intrepreting ROC asymmetries
(Dunn, 2008; Glanzer et al., 1999; Heathcote, Raymond, & Dunn, 2006; Wixted, 2007,
e.g.,). In the following sections, I present a novel argument for why the single-process
view of memory is more plausible than previously thought.
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Figure 1.6: The dual-process signal detection model. A. Graphical representation
of the UVSD model for a confidence rating task with 6 response options. The new-
item distributuion is a standard normal, the studied-item distributuion is normal
with mean d′ and variance σ2. B. ROC curves from UVSD model with two different
values of sigma2. C. ROC data from a confidence ratings task and predictions from
the best-fitting EVSD and UVSD models.
1.4 Separating Process and Nuisance Variability
Recognition responses (e.g., which confidence rating is made) vary from trial-to-trial.
This variability is in part due to variability in process (e.g., recollection occurring
or not). Trial-to-trial variability, however, also arises because each trial is a unique
combination of a participant and an item. Each participant has a unique mnemonic
ability and response bias. Items also differ in sensitivity and bias. For example, an
item’s word frequency (how often the word appears in common texts) has a large effect
on its ability to be remembered (Peters, 1936; Scarborough, Cortese, & Scarborough,
1977; Schwartz & Rouse, 1961; Shepard, 1967). It is critical to separate variability due
to the mnemonic process from that due to items and participants. Many researchers,
however, have overlooked this point, especially on what variability in process entails.
To understand variability in process, consider the hypothetical situation in which
a single participant is tested on a single item. If we could perform this test over and
over, without any learning or testing effects, the variability in response would reflect
the mnemonic process for this participant and item combination. The underlying
patterns in this variability, such as whether the resulting confidence rating ROCs are
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curved or straight lines, or are asymmetric, reflect deep structural properties that
are not a function of the person or item. An example of such a property is that
recognition memory is mediated by a mixture of recollection and familiarity. In fact,
the elucidation of these structural properties, uncontaminated by variability in people
or items, is the main object of study. Separate from these deep structural properties
is variation from items and participants. For instance, the probability of recollection
in DPSD may vary across items.
The ramifications of this fact are subtle, especially when discussing the UVSD
model. Mickes, Wixted, and Wais (2007) and Wixted (2007), for example, speculate
that the asymmetry in ROC plots reflects item variability rather than a deep struc-
tural property. They note that items will differ in how much strength is gained at
study, and when data are averaged, this difference will result in greater variability
across studied items than new. This scenario, however, is not the only possibility. It
may be that the asymmetry is a deep structural property that does not reflect item
variability but is instead a signature of process variability. In fact, the dual-process
model is a process-variability explanation because recollection is assumed to occur
and add asymmetry even in the absence of item variation. In the next section I pro-
vide a concrete example of how averaging data over items confounds item variability
with variability in process.
1.5 The Effects of Averaging In Recognition Mem-
ory
The effects of averaging data in any non-linear context depend on what the true
generating model is, the true parameters of that model, and the extent to which those
parameters vary. Obviously we are not privy to the true model or its parameters,
but we can consider some hypothetical cases. For example, it is well known that
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words vary in their memorability (e.g., due to word-frequency differences). In signal
detection, these effects would be manifest as different values of d′ across items. Rouder
and Lu (2005) and Rouder et al. (2007) showed that in old-new recognition, such
variability in d′ will bias estimates of d′ to be too small, and bias confidence intervals
on those estimates to be too small. Here I demonstrate the effects of averaging
confidence-ratings data with item variability, first considered in Morey, Pratte, and
Rouder (2008) and Pratte, Rouder, and Morey (in press).
Imagine that recognition memory is mediated by the simple equal-variance signal
detection model presented previously. Consider also that the stimuli consist of easy
and hard items (low and high d′ values, respectively). In order to construct ROC
curves and estimate model parameters the data are averaged over the easy and hard
items. Fitting the UVSD and DPSD models to these averaged data should provide
estimates of σ2 = 1.0 and R = 0, respectively.
To make the situation concrete, let d′ for the easy and hard items be 3 and 1,
respectively. For a criterion of 1.0 data can be generated from the true model with
averaged parameter d′ = 2 as follows:
Ftrue = Φ(−1) = .16
Htrue = Φ(2− 1) = .84
In real analysis, data are not generated from the average model, but rather, data are
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generated differently for the easy and hard items, and these data are averaged:
Fhard = Φ(−1) = .16
Hhard = Φ(1− 1) = .50
Feasy = Φ(−1) = .16
Heasy = Φ(3− 1) = .98
Faveraged =
.16 + .16
2
= .16
Haveraged =
.50 + .98
2
= .74
The false alarm rates are the same for the true (average) model and the averaged data
because different values of d′ do not affect false alarm rates. The hit rate obtained
by averaging data, however, is substantially lower that that generated from the true
(average) model. The result is that performance will be underestimated; this result
holds across a range of true d′ values and levels of variability (Rouder et al., 2007).
Critically, note that in this demonstration no noise other than that between items
was introduced. The fact that the bias in sensitivity is present even in the absence
of random noise shows that it is asymptotic: the results from averaged data will be
wrong regardless of how much data are collected.
The above demonstration can be extended to ROC data by completing the same
data-generation and averaging procedures for a range of criteria. The results of this
demonstration are displayed in Figure 1.7. The solid line is the ROC generated from
the true model; EVSD with d′ = 2.0. The dashed line shows the ROC generated
by averaging hit and false alarm rates over easy and hard items. Clearly this data-
averaged ROC does not reflect the averaged generating model. The most alarming
aspect of this data-averaged ROC is that it is asymmetric about the negative diagnol
in excactly the manner predicted by UVSD and DPSD. In fact, fitting the UVSD
model to averaged data reveals an estimate of σ2 = 1.72; similar to what is commonly
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observed. Likewise, fitting the dual-process model to these data reveals an estimate
of recollection R = .30, a value also in line with common findings. Again, this bias
resulting from averaging over items that vary is asymptotic: it will occur regardless
of how much data is collected, and replicating results (e.g., asymmetry) will only
replicate the bias. The result is that, when data are averaged over items that vary,
variability in those items is confounded with variability in process, such that item
variability will be mistaken for evidence for processes such as recollection.
The distortions due to averaging have been acknowledged by a minority of au-
thors including Malmberg and Xu (2006), Ratcliff, McKoon, and Tindall (1994), and
Wixted (2007). Nevertheless, in all previous studies of recognition memory, data
were averaged over people, items, or both in order to construct ROC curves and/or
fit formal models. As a result, all support for models that are more complex than
EVSD should be viewed as tenuous at best. These models include both UVSD and
DPSD.
The result of averaging in Figure 1.7 is only one of an infininte number of possibil-
ities. For example, perhaps there is more or less variability in d′ than in the example;
perhaps there is variability in response biases (criterion). Alternatively, perhaps the
dual-process model is the true generating model. If so, then ROC asymmetry is real,
but data averaged from the dual-process model will be distorted in other ways. Fig-
ure 1.7 shows a worst-case senario: a simple model being rejected for complex models
due to bias, and that bias being intrepreted as a meaningful characteristic of the
mnemonic system. Regardless of what the true generating process is, however, data
averaged over participants or items will be distorted in some way.
Constructing ROCs and fitting formal models using conventional techniques re-
quires that data are averaged over something (people or items) in order to construct
hit and false alarm rates. In order to avoid distortions from averaging, it is necessary
to specify models at the participant by item level. For example, in EVSD each person
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Figure 1.7: The effect of averaging data generated from the EVSD model with easy
(d′ = 3) and hard (d′ = 1) items. The solid line is the ROC curve from the true
average model (EVSD with d′ = 2). The dashed line is the ROC curve resulting from
averaging hit and false alarm rates across the easy and hard items.
and each item must be free to have different d′ and criteria parameters. Doing so is
far from trivial, and is only plausible due to very recent advances in statistics and
computer power. These difficulties reveal why previous researchers have been content
to average data: the alternative is hard.
In the following chapters I develop EVSD, UVSD, DPSD, and other recognition
memory models that explicitly account for participant and item variation. These
models provide the first accurate picture of what recognition memory data look like
without distortions from averaging. In Chapter 2 I develop the UVSD model and use
it to determine whether ROC curves are truly asymmetric (i.e., σ2 > 1.0) when partic-
ipants and items are not averaged over as in Figure 1.7. The results reveal that ROC
asymmetry is real. In Chapter 3 I develop a dual-process model that accounts for par-
ticipant and item variability, and compare it to the UVSD model. The results reveal
that the dual-process model provides a better fit to the data than the UVSD model.
The results also suggest, however, that a single-process model other than UVSD may
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be able to account for the data. Given the success of the fit of the dual-process model
in Chapter 3, in Chapter 4 I explore whether the recollection and familiarity param-
eters of the dual-process model are truly independent, by assessing whether they can
be selectively influenced by different manipulations. The results indicate that, when
participant and item variability are properly accounted for, manipulations of study
list length reduce estimates of recollection, whereas levels of familiarity are reletively
preserved. In addition, a levels-of-processing manipulation is shown to greatly affect
recollection estimates but affect familiarity only slightly. The results suggest that,
perhaps, two processes are needed to account for recognition memory, and that these
may be recollection and familiarity as defined in the Yonelinas dual-process mode.
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Chapter 2
Accounting for Participant and
Item Effects in UVSD
In Chapter 1 it was shown that averaging data over participants or items may result
in ROC asymmetry even when the data were generated from an equal-variance signal
detection model. To avoid this bias it is necessary to measure ROC asymmetry
without confounding it with person or item variability. Because the value of σ2 in
UVSD is a measure of ROC asymmetry, an estimate of σ2 from a UVSD model
that accounts for participant and item variability provides an unbiased measure of
ROC asymmetry. If ROC curves are symmetric, then this uncontaminated estimate
of σ2 will equal 1.0. Alternatively, if this estimate of σ2 is greater than 1.0, then
asymmetry is a feature of the mnemonic process and not a result of item variability.
In this Chapter I develop the hierarchical UVSD model, which explicitly accounts for
participant and item variability. This work is based on Morey, Pratte, and Rouder
(2008) and Pratte et al. (in press). This model is similar to the signal detection
model for two-alternative forced-choice data developed in Rouder and Lu (2005) and
Rouder et al. (2007), but can account for confidence ratings data.
The UVSD model is used here as a psychometric model for measuring ROC asym-
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metry. The key parameter is σ2; if ROCs are symmetric, then σ2 = 1.0. As asymmetry
in ROCs increases, σ2 increases above 1.0. The use of UVSD is motivated by a number
of factors: First, UVSD was the first, and remains the most straightforward gener-
alization of signal detection theory made to account for asymmetry. Second, UVSD
has been shown repeatedly to provide a good fit to averaged data (e.g., Glanzer et al.,
1999; Heathcote, 2003; Slotnick & Dodson, 2005; Wixted, 2007) and thus provides a
logical starting point for fitting non-averaged data. Third, providing a hierarchical ex-
tension of UVSD is both feasible and convenient, as evidenced by the two-alternative
model developed in Rouder et al. (2007). In theory, it is possible that other models,
such as Yonelinas’ dual process model, may be extended hierarchically to measure
asymmetry. In DPSD the estimate of recollection serves as the index of asymmetry.
This model is developed in Chapter 3.
2.1 Hierarchial UVSD Model Specification
Consider a recognition memory test in which each of I participants (i = 1, . . . , I) is
tested on each of J items (j = 1, . . . , J). According to signal detection theory each
item at test gives rise to some latent mnemonic strength denotedXij. Participants are
assumed to place criteria on the latent strength dimension such that the probability
of making the kth response is equal to the probability that the latent strength falls
between the k−1 and kth criterion. Typically, the mean of the new-item distribution is
set to 0.0 to fix the location of the strength space. It is more convenient in accounting
for item and participant effects to allow this mean to be a free parameter and center
the space on a criterion (see Rouder et al., 2007). A graphical representation of the
UVSD model with this parameterization is shown in Figure 2.1A. Latent strengths
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are given by:
Xij ∼
 Normal(d
(n)
ij , 1) new,
Normal(d
(s)
ij , σ
2) studied,
where d
(s)
ij and d
(n)
ij are means for the ij person-by-item combination when the item is
studied and new, respectively, and σ2 is the studied-item variance that is assumed to
be the same across all participants and items (this assumption is tested in Chapter 3).
Criteria cik are assumed to vary across participants, but not across items. This
variability in individual criteria reflects participants’ biases for certain responses over
others. The probability that the ith person makes the kth response to the jth item
is:
Pr(yij = k| new) = Φ
(
d
(n)
ij − cik
)
− Φ
(
d
(n)
ij − ci(k−1)
)
,
Pr(yij = k| studied) = Φ
(
d
(s)
ij − cik
σ2
)
− Φ
(
d
(s)
ij − ci(k−1)
σ2
)
,
where c0˙ = −∞, cK˙/2 = 0 (C(˙K+1)/2 = 0 if K is odd), cK˙ = ∞, and Φ is the CDF of
the standard normal.
In this parametrization sensitivity d′ is the distance between the new and studied-
item distributions d′ij = d
(s)
ij − d(n)ij . Overall response biases (e.g., to response “stud-
ied”) are concurrent shifts in the distributions (see Figure 2.1B). It has been shown
that differences between conditions often manifest as concurrent increases in hit rates
and decreases in false alarm rates (Glanzer & Adams, 1990; Glanzer, Adams, Iver-
son, & Kim, 1993; Stretch & Wixted, 1998). This pattern, termed the mirror effect,
suggests that in conditions in which items are more easily recognized as studied when
they were studied, items that are new are also better recognized as such. In the
parameterization used here, mirror effect are negative correlations between the new
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and studied-item distributions (see Figure 2.1C).
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Figure 2.1: Hierarchical UVSD model. A. Hierarchical unequal-variance signal detec-
tion model with middle criteria fixed to 0.0 and the mean of the new-item distribution
(d(n)) free to vary. B. Response biases are represented as concurrent shifts, or pos-
itive correlations, in the new and studied-item means. C. Mirror effects present as
negative correlations in the new and studied-item means.
The means of the new and studied-item distributions can not be estimated without
some restriction, as each participant-by-item combination occurs only once, and only
as either new or studied. To make the model estimable, additive structures are placed
on the means:
d
(n)
ij = µ
(n) + α
(n)
i + β
(n)
j , (2.1)
d
(s)
ij = µ
(s) + α
(s)
i + β
(s)
j + θ
(s)lij, (2.2)
where µ(n) and µ(s) are grand means, α
(n)
i and α
(s)
i are participant effects, and β
(n)
j
and β
(s)
j are item effects. In addition to participant and item effects, recognition
responses may be effected by the number of items that intervene between the study
and test of an item, termed the lag for that item. Parameter θ(s) is the linear effect
of this study-test lag lij.
Participant and item effects are treated as random effects — they are considered
samples from parent distributions. The following parent distributions are placed on
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participant and item effects:
α
(n)
i ∼ Normal(0, σ2α,n), (2.3)
β
(n)
j ∼ Normal(0, σ2β,n), (2.4)
α
(s)
i ∼ Normal(0, σ2α,s), (2.5)
β
(s)
j ∼ Normal(0, σ2β,s). (2.6)
The variances (σ2α,n, σ
2
β,n, σ
2
α,s, σ
2
β,s) are free parameters; their magnitudes reflect the
size of participant and item variability.
The effect of the hierarchical structures is to shrink effect estimates toward zero.
This shrinkage will be largest for extreme effects—the interpretation is that extreme
effects are the result of noise, rather than having been generated from extreme true
values. The amount of shrinkage depends on how much evidence there is for extreme
effects, determined both by how much data there are and how well those data inform
parameter estimates. For example, Figure 2.2 shows estimates of sensitivity d′ for each
of the 480 items in Experiment 1 (presented below) from the hierarchical model, as a
function of estimates obtained from an equivalent non-hierarchical fixed-effects model.
Shrinkage is seen as pulling items with small d′ estimates up (toward the average
item), and pulling items with large estimates down. Although both the hierarchical
and non-hierarchical versions have the same number of parameters (one for each item),
the hierarchical model is more constrained as parameters are not as free to vary from
one another. Random-effects modeling has been preferred for hierarchical modeling
of cognitive phenomena because it provides a more parsimonious model as well as
a means of generalizing results to a larger class of participants and items (e.g., Lee,
2006; Morey, Rouder, & Speckman, 2008, 2009; Rouder et al., 2007; Rouder, Morey,
et al., 2008; Rouder, Tuerlinckx, Speckman, Lu, & Gomez, 2008). In chapter 3 the
choice to model effects hierarchically by letting effect variances be a free parameter
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Figure 2.2: The effect of hierarchical structure on sensitivity d′ for the 480 items
presented in Experiment 1. Item sensitivities are defined as µ(s) − µ(n) + β(s)j − β(n)j .
Estimates on the y-axis are from the hierarchical model presented in Chapter 1.
Estimates on the x-axis are from the same model, but with no hierarchical pooling.
This non-hierarchical model was achieved by setting the priors on effect variances
σ2
β(n)
and σ2
β(s)
to 2.0, as opposed to the hierarchical model in which these parameters
were estimated as .20 and .16, respectively.
is compared with non-hierarchical versions in which variance parameters are fixed to
relatively large values.
2.2 Model Analysis
The hierarchical UVSD model is conveniently analyzed in the Bayesian framework
with Gibbs sampling (Gelfand & Smith, 1990). In this section, I provide a brief
introduction to Bayesian analysis, justify priors for the UVSD model, present the
full conditional posterior distributions of each parameter, and provide sampling algo-
rithms for estimating the marginal posterior distributions of the parameters. I have
developed the R library hbmem which performs the model analysis in a fully auto-
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mated fashion. This library may be installed by issuing install.packages(hbmem) at
the R prompt. The included function simUVSD will simulate data from the hierar-
chial UVSD model developed above, the function sampleUVSD will fit the hierarchical
UVSD model to those data using the procedures outlined below.
2.2.1 An Introduction to Bayesian Analysis
In order to briefly introduce Bayesian analysis I develop a simple normal model (see
Rouder and Lu (2005) or Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin (2004) for more in-depth
treatments). Consider the case in which Xi, i = 1, . . . , I, are normally distributed
with unknown mean µ and variance σ2:
Xi ∼ Normal(µ, σ2)
The goal of Bayesian analysis is to determine the distributuion of the unknown param-
eters µ and σ2 given the data Xi. This quantity is termed the posterior distributuion
of the parameters. The likelihood function for the model is the probability of the
data, given the parameters. Bayes’ theorem gives the relationship between these two
different conditional statements:
f(µ, σ2|Xi) = f(Xi|µ, σ
2)f(µ, σ2)
f(Xi)
The term f(µ, σ2) is the prior distribution of the parameters, and specifies our prior
beliefs about what values the parameters may be, before observing any data. The
goal is to find the term on the left, the joint posterior distribution of the parameters.
To do so we only need to consider terms on the right that involve the parameters of
interest (everything else cancels out in integration). The posterior then need only be
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defined up to constants of proportionality with respect to the parameters:
f(µ, σ2|Xi) ∝ f(Xi|µ, σ2)f(µ, σ2) (2.7)
This equation states that the distributuion of the parameters given the data is pro-
portional to the likelihood f(Xi|µ, σ2) times the prior f(µ, σ2). For the normal model
the likelihood is:
f(Xi|µ, σ2) = 1√
2piσ2
exp
(∑I
i=1(Xi − µ)2
−2σ2
)
The prior distribution f(µ, σ2) is chosen before analysis. There are many options
for priors in this example, and there are good reasons for choosing some over others.
Here I choose the distributional form of priors based on how convenient they are, and
choose the parameters of those forms so that priors are relatively uninformative, that
is, they have little influence on estimates. Parameters µ and σ2 are independent, and
so the joint prior f(µ, σ2) is simply the product of the marginal priors on µ and σ2
which are:
µ ∼ Normal(µ0, σ20)
σ2 ∼ IG(α, β)
where IG is the inverse gamma distribution with scale α and shape β. Prior param-
eters µ0, σ
2
0, α, and β are choosen before analysis to reflect how much knowledge we
have about each parameter. To make the prior on µ weakly informative the value of
σ20 is set to a large number. To make the prior on σ
2 weakly informative the values
of both α and β are choosen to be near zero. According to this specification the form
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of the priors are:
f(µ|µ0, σ20) =
1√
2piσ20
exp
(
(µ− µ0)2
−2σ20
)
f(σ2|α, β) = α
β
Γ(β)
(
1
σ2
)β+1
exp
(−α/σ2)
The joint prior f(µ, σ2) is simply the product of these marginal priors. Multiplying
the likelihood and the priors according to Equation 2.7 yields the joint posterior.
Again, in constructing the posterior we can ignore all terms that are multiplicative
constants with respect to the parameters, yielding:
f(µ, σ2|Xi, µ0, σ20, α, β) ∝ exp
(∑I
i=1(Xi − µ)2
−2σ2
)
exp
(
(µ− µ0)2
−2σ20
)(
1
σ2
)β+1
exp
(−α/σ2)
(2.8)
Equation 2.8 is the joint posterior distribution of parameters µ and σ2 given some
data Xi and prior parameters. Our main interest is not in the full joint posterior,
but rather, we would like to know the marginal distributions of µ and σ2. In fact,
parameters like σ2 are often of no interest at all, and our wish is to learn about
parameter µ without regard to or interest in σ2. Finding the marginal posteriors
of parameters from the joint is a matter of integrating the joint posterior over all
parameters except the one of interest:
f(µ) ∝
∫ ∞
0
f(µ, σ2|Xi, µ0, σ20, a, b) dσ2.
f(σ2) ∝
∫ ∞
−∞
f(µ, σ2|Xi, µ0, σ20, a, b) dµ.
In most applications, including this one, it is not possible to evaluate these integrals
analytically. Instead, they may be evaluated computationally using Markov chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) integration. In MCMC integration samples are drawn from the
conditional posterior distribution of each parameter, i.e., the parameter conditioned
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on a random draw from the posterior of all other parameters. Conditional posteriors
are easily derived from the joint posterior. For example, the conditional posterior of
µ given σ2 is the terms of the full joint posterior involving µ:
f(µ|Xi, σ2, µ0, σ20) ∝ exp
(∑I
i=1(Xi − µ)2
−2σ2
)
exp
(
(µ− µ0)2
−2σ20
)
which here is the likelihood and the prior on µ. As stated, in MCMC the goal is
to draw samples of µ from this conditional distribution. There are many techniques
for sampling from unknown distributions such as the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
In this case, though, the conditional posterior of µ is actually a normal distribution.
Expanding the polynomials and collecting terms, the posteior can be rewritten as:
f(µ|Xi, σ2, µ0, σ20) ∝ exp
(
−1
2
[
µ2
(
I
σ2
+
1
σ20
)
− 2µ
(
IX¯
σ2
+
µ0
σ20
)])
.
Let λ = ( IX¯
σ2
+ µ0
σ20
) and τ = ( I
σ2
+ 1
σ20
)−1. Completing the square yields:
f(µ|Xi, σ2, µ0, σ20) ∝ exp
(
(µ− λτ)2
−2τ
)
which is (up to a constant of proportionality with respect to µ) a normal distribution:
f(µ|Xi, σ2, µ0, σ20) ∼ Normal(λτ, τ) (2.9)
In this example, if σ20 is set to ∞, it is clear that the posterior distributuion of µ is
the sampling distributuion of µ in traditional frequentist statistics. Choosing large
values of σ20 thus approximates the frequentist treatment of µ.
The conditional posterior for σ2 can be shown to be an inverse gamma distribution
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with a similar exposition as for µ above:
f(σ2|Xi, µ, α, β) ∼ IG
(
I
2
+ α,
∑I
i=1(Xi − µ)2
2
+ β
)
(2.10)
Having derived the conditional distributions of each parameter, we can now use
MCMC to estimate the marginal distributions. To do so MCMC includes the following
steps:
Step 1. Choose starting values for µ and σ2. Although choosing starting values that
are close to true values will speed estimation, in most situations the choice is
arbitrary.
Step 2. Sample µ from its conditional distribution in Equation 2.9, with σ2 set to
its starting value.
Step 3. Sample σ2 from its conditional distribution in Equation 2.10 with the value
of µ set to that just sampled in step 2.
Step 4. Take another sample of µ, but now with the value of σ2 set to that just
sampled in step 4.
Step 5. Repeat steps 3 and 4 several of times. The number of times are refered to
as the iterations of the MCMC loop.
These steps may be easily implimented in any programing language that is capable
of drawing random samples form normal and gamma distributions. I provide R code
for demonstration:
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#Make Data
I=50 #Number of samples
X=rnorm(I,100,sqrt(15)) #Generate Data
xbar=mean(X)
#Set Priors
mu0=0
sig20=100
a=b=.01
#Prepare For MCMC Chain
M=1000 #Number of MCMC iterations
s.mu=rep(NA,M) #Save space for samples of mu
s.sig2=rep(NA,M) #Save space for samples of sigma2
s.mu[1]=90 #Starting value for mu
s.sig2[1]=5 #Starting value for sigma2
for(m in 2:M) #Begin MCMC Loop
{
#Sample mu, given last s.sig2
lambda=I*xbar/s.sig2[m-1] + mu0/sig20
tau=(I/s.sig2[m-1] + 1/sig20)^(-1)
s.mu[m]=rnorm(1,lambda*tau,sqrt(tau))
#Sample sigma2, given just sampled s.mu
SS=sum((X-s.mu[m])^2)
s.sig2[m]=1/rgamma(1,shape=I/2 + a,rate=SS/2 + b)
}
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The result of the MCMC loop are samples from the marginal posterior distribu-
tions of µ and σ2. Figures 2.3A and B show these samples for µ and σ2, respectively,
for each iteration of the chain. As can be seen, the chains get very near their true
values quickly. This is referred to as convergence, and shows why the choice of start-
ing value is unimportant in this example. After looking at the chain in this manner,
several of the first samples are discarded until it is clear that the chain has converged.
This burnin period ensures that all samples are actually from the posterior, and are
not influenced by our choice of the starting values. Means of these samples, termed
posterior means, serve as point estimates of parameters. The variance of the samples
characterizes our uncertainity in the parameter estimates. Similarly, quantiles of the
samples serve as credible intervals. For example, the .025 and .975 quantiles describe
the region that contains 95% of the posterior mass. For µ, the posterior mean for
these data is 99.45; the 95% credible interval is (98.32, 100.56). Given these data,
we are 95% confident that the true value of µ lies within this region. Rather than
rely on summary statistics, Figures 2.3C and D show smoothed histograms derived
from the sampled marginal distributions. These are the (approximated) marginal
distributuions of µ and σ2 given the data.
The steps for estimating more complex models follow the same procedures outlined
above. Sometimes, however, conditional posteriors do not follow a known form such
as the Normal, and must be sampled with more specialized techniques. Moreover,
often the chains do not converge so rapidly as those in the simple normal model, and
so many MCMC iterations with a large burnin is needed. Finally, for many models
there is autocorrelation in the samples of a parameter, such that each draw is not
an independent draw from the posterior. When this happens steps must be taken to
mitigate the autocorrelation. In all cases, however, the end result is samples from the
marginal posterior distribution of each parameter.
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Figure 2.3: Samples from marginal posterior distributions of the normal model. A.
Chain from samples of µ across 1000 MCMC iterations. B. Chain from samples of σ2
across 1000 MCMC iterations. C. Smoothed histogram of samples of µ. D. Smoothed
histogram of samples of σ2.
2.2.2 Priors for UVSD Model
Normal priors are placed on the grand means of the new- and studied-item distribu-
tions and lag effects:
µ(n), µ(s), θ(s)
iid∼ Normal(0, σ2µ).
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Inverse gamma priors are placed on all variance parameters:
σ2
iid∼ IG(a, b),
σ2α(n) , σ
2
β(n) , σ
2
α(s) , σ
2
β(s)
iid∼ IG(e, f).
Values of σ2µ, a, b, e and f must be chosen before analysis. As long as the value of σ
2
µ
is sufficiently large, the prior is approximately non-informative. I use σ2µ = 100 though
other large values will yield the same results. Values of a = e = 2 and b = f = 1
work well. With these choices for (a, b, e, f), the priors are vaguely informative, but
this information has a minimal effect on the posterior means for variance parameters.
Simulation studies reveal that, given a reasonable sample size, the model converges
with less informative priors (e.g., σ2µ = 1000, a = b = e = f = .01), and more
informative priors (e.g., σ2µ = 10) have only negligible effects on estimates. For smaller
sample sizes (e.g., 25 participants), the choice of priors becomes more important, and
the effect of various choices should be explored through simulation.
2.2.3 Conditional Posterior Distributions
The following notation is used in deriving the conditional posterior distributions.
Parameters in bold type indicate a vector of parameters or data; for example, y
denotes the vector of all data. Let sij indicate whether the jth item for the ith
participant was studied (sij = 1) or not (sij = 0). Derivation of conditional posterior
distributions is greatly aided by introducing a set of latent variables. Following Albert
and Chib (1993), let wij be related to yij as follows:
(yij = k)⇐⇒ (ci(k−1) ≤ wij < cik).
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Random variables wij are distributed as normals:
wij
indep.∼
 Normal(d
(n)
ij , 1), sij = 0,
Normal(d
(s)
ij , σ
2), sij = 1.
With these definitions, it is obvious that
Pr(yij = k) = Pr(ci(k−1) ≤ wij < cik)
=

Φ
(
d
(n)
ij − cik
)
− Φ
(
d
(n)
ij − ci(k−1)
)
, sij = 0,
Φ
(
d
(s)
ij −cik√
σ2
)
− Φ
(
d
(s)
ij −ci(k−1)√
σ2
)
, sij = 1,
The latent data are introduced because it is more convenient to derive full conditional
posterior distributions conditioned on w than on y.
The conditional posterior distributions are provided by the following facts. Through-
out, let θ | · denote the full conditional posterior of parameter θ.
Fact 1: The conditional posterior distribution of wij is
wij | · indep∼
 TN(ci(yij−1),ci(yij))(µ
(n) + α
(n)
i + β
(n)
j , 1), sij = 0,
TN(ci(yij−1),ci(yij))(µ
(s) + α
(s)
i + β
(s)
j + θ
(s)lij, σ
2), sij = 1,
where TN(a,b)(µ, σ
2) is a Normal(µ, σ2) distribution truncated below at a and
above at b.
Fact 2: Let Nn =
∑
i,j(1−sij) be the number of total trials in which nonstudied
items are tested. Let λn be the vector of grand mean, participant, and item
effects for nonstudied trials: λn = [ µ
(n), (α(n))T , (β(n))T ]T . Let wn be the
vector of wij for nonstudied trials. Let Xn be the Nn×(I+J+1) design matrix
such that E[wn]= Xnλn. Let 1 denote the covariance matrix of wn. Finally,
let Σ
(n)
λ = diag( σ
2
µ, σ
2
α(n)
, . . . , σ2
β(n)
, . . . ). Then the full conditional posterior
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distribution of λn is
λn | Σ(n)w ,Σ(n)λ ,wn ∼ MVNormalq
(
1
σ2n
VnX
T
nwn,Vn
)
,
where q = I + J + 1 and Vn =
(
1
σ2n
XTnXn + (Σ
(n)
λ )
−1
)−1
.
Fact 3: Let Ns, λs, ws, Xs, and Σ
(s)
λ be defined analogously to the comparable
quantities in Fact 2. Then the full conditional posterior distribution of λs is
λs | Σ(s)w ,Σ(s)λ ,ws ∼ MVNormalq
(
1
σ2s
VsX
T
s ws,Vs
)
,
where Vs =
(
1
σ2
XTs Xs + (Σ
(s)
λ )
−1
)−1
.
Fact 4: The full conditional posterior distributions of σ2, σ2
α(n)
, σ2
α(s)
, σ2
β(n)
, σ2
β(s)
are
σ2 | wij,λ ∼ IG
(
a+
1
2
Ns, b+
1
2
∑
i,j
sij(wij − µ(s) − α(s)i − β(s)j − θ(s)lij)2
)
,
σ2α(n) | wij,λ ∼ IG
(
e+
I
2
, f +
1
2
∑
i
(α
(n)
i )
2
)
,
σ2α(s) | wij,λ ∼ IG
(
e+
I
2
, f +
1
2
∑
i
(α
(s)
i )
2
)
,
σ2β(n) | wij,λ ∼ IG
(
e+
J
2
, f +
1
2
∑
j
(β
(n)
j )
2
)
,
σ2β(s) | wij,λ ∼ IG
(
e+
J
2
, f +
1
2
∑
j
(β
(s)
j )
2
)
.
Fact 5: The full conditional posterior distribution of ci` is
40
ci` | · indep.∼ Unif
(
max
j
[wij such that yij = `],
min
j
[wij such that yij = `+ 1]
)
, ` = 2, . . . , K − 2. (2.11)
In Facts 2 and 3, separate full conditional posterior distributions were presented
for λs and λn rather than for λ = (λs
T ,λn
T )T . The reason for this separation
is computational speed. The full conditional posteriors require inverting precision
matrices and the speed of this operation is a power function of matrix rank. The
precision matrices for the full conditional posteriors of λs and λn have half of the
rows of the precision matrix of the full conditional posterior of λ. Inverting the two,
smaller matrices is significantly faster than inverting the larger one.
2.2.4 Sampling Algorithms
In Gibbs sampling, it is necessary to sample from the conditional posterior distribu-
tions. Fortunately, all of the conditional posterior distributions in Facts 1-5 are easy
to sample from and details are provided in Rouder et al. (2007). Although sampling
is straightforward, the resulting MCMC chains show a large degree of autocorrelation,
especially in the criteria (see Figure 2.5, panels A and B). A high degree of autocorre-
lation is undesirable because obtaining adequate convergence requires a large number
of Gibbs sampling iterations.
The source of the autocorrelation may be diagnosed. The distribution of ci`|· in
Eq. (2.11) is uniform between two values: the maximum wij in the response category
below the criterion, and the minimum wij in the response category above the criterion.
As shown in Figure 2.4, from iteration to iteration, the maximum latent value in
response category k and minimum latent value in category k + 1 will be close to one
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another, restricting the range of the full conditional posterior distribution. Because
the range of the distribution is restricted, samples of ci` will change very little from
iteration to iteration in the Gibbs sampler. In Figure 2.4, each response category
contains 20 responses; the problem gets worse with more responses in each category.
The result is high autocorrelation in the criteria chains, as shown in Figure 2.5,
panels A and B.
MCMC Iteration n
Response k Response k+1
Criterion k+1
MCMC Iteration n+1
Response k Response k+1
Criterion k+1
Familiarity
MCMC Iteration n+2
Response k Response k+1
Criterion k+1
Figure 2.4: Source of autocorrelation in criteria chains. Panels from top to bottom
represent successive MCMC iterations. Dashed and dotted lines represent latent
variables wij in categories k and k + 1, respectively. The shaded box is a uniform
distribution from which criterion k + 1is sampled.
In order to mitigate this autocorrelation, we can modify the sampling scheme.
Instead of sampling from the full conditional posterior of ci` in Fact 5, we sample
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Figure 2.5: Top panels show segments of the MCMC chain for a selected criterion
with Gibbs sampling. Bottom panels show autocorrelation functions for the chains.
from the conditional distribution
∫
w
[ci,w | λn,λs, σ2n, σ2s ,y] dw = [ci | λn,λs, σ2n, σ2s ,y] (2.12)
on every iteration of the Gibbs sampler. Integrating over the latent variables leads to
more efficient MCMC chains (Holmes & Held, 2006). Let c
(t)
i` be a sample of the `th
criterion for the ith participant, on the tth iteration of the MCMC chain. On each
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iteration t, the following Metropolis-Hastings step is implemented to sample from
(2.12).
Step 1. For each participant i, sample K − 2 independent values z(t)i2 , . . . , z(t)i(K−2) from
a Normal(0, σ2d) distribution. The value σ
2
d is chosen before analysis.
Step 2. Let c
∗(t)
i` = c
(t−1)
i` + z
(t)
i` for ` = 2, . . . , K − 2. The parameter c∗(t)i` serves as a
proposal for a new sample of ci`.
Step 3. For each participant, check that all proposal criteria are in the correct order, i.e.
c
∗(t)
i` < c
∗(t)
i(`+1) for ` = 1, . . . , K−1. If the criteria are out of order for participant
i, set bi = 0 and skip Step 4 for participant i.
Step 4. For each participant, compute the likelihood of the model given the proposal
criteria c
∗(t)
i` , and the likelihood of the model given the samples c
(t−1)
i` , then
compute its ratio, bi:
bi =
J∏
j=1

Φ
(
c
∗(t)
i(yij)
−d(s)ij√
σ2
)
− Φ
(
c
∗(t)
i(yij−1)−d
(s)
ij√
σ2
)
Φ
(
c
(t−1)
i(yij)
−d(s)ij√
σ2
)
− Φ
(
c
(t−1)
i(yij−1)−d
(s)
ij√
σ2
)

sij
×
J∏
j=1
Φ
(
c
∗(t)
i(yij)
− d(n)ij
)
− Φ
(
c
∗(t)
i(yij−1) − d
(n)
ij
)
Φ
(
c
(t−1)
i(yij)
− d(n)ij
)
− Φ
(
c
(t−1)
i(yij−1) − d
(n)
ij
)
1−sij (2.13)
Step 5. For each participant, accept the proposal criteria c∗(t) as the new sample for the
criteria c(t) with probability min(bi,1). Otherwise, let c
(t) = c(t−1).
Because the expression bi is not dependent on latent data w, this source of auto-
correlation is eliminated. Figure 2.5 shows a sample of a chain for a selected criterion
and its autocorrelation function. As can be seen, the new sampling scheme is highly
effective.
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The value of σ2d must be chosen before the analysis. Some values of σ
2
d are more
effective than others. If the value is too high, values of c
∗(t)
i` are unreasonably large or
small, and the candidate is rejected too often. If the value is too low, candidates do
not deviate enough from the last sample and the chains will be highly autocorrelated.
One option is to experiment with several values of σ2d until an acceptance rate (Step
5) between 35% to 45% is achieved. Another option (which is envoked in the hbmem
package) is to auto-tune σ2d during the burnin period. That is, for the first several
iterations increment σ2d if the cumulative acceptance rate is too high, and decriment
it if the acceptance rate is to low. If these first iterations are discarded, and σ2d is
held constant for the remaining iterations, then the chain will be an accurate sample
from the posterior.
2.2.5 Model Performance
The hierarchical UVSD model is used here as a psychometric measurement tool. I
performed several simulations to show that for this purpose, the model is robust.
That is, it may be used to measure ROC asymmetry even if UVSD or the constituent
hierarchical assumptions fail:
1. How well does the model measure σ? Data were simulated from the equal-
variance signal detection model (with true values from estimates in the subse-
quently reported experiment) and fit with the unequal-variance model. Over
100 such simulations, the mean estimate of σ was 1.04, and 95% of the esti-
mates fell between .998 and 1.08. Although these simulations show that the
estimate of σ has a slight positive bias, it can distinguish between symmetric
ROCs (σ = 1) and those typically observed (σ = 1.28). This slight bias is non-
asymptotic, i.e., it diminishes with more participants or more items. The bias
may be mitigated completely by reparameterizing the model such that both
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the lowest and highest criteria are fixed (e.g., at 0 and 1, respectively) and the
variances of both the new and studied-item distributions are free parameters.
The ratio of the studied- to new-item strength variances are σ2 in the current
parameterization, and this ratio proviedes an unbiased estimate of σ2. This
model is developed fully in Morey, Pratte, and Rouder (2008); The estimate of
σ2 in Experiment 1 is the same for both parameterizations, and thus, does not
reflect bias.
2. What happens if effects are not distributed as normals? The assumption
of normally-distributed participant and item effects is not important for mea-
suring σ2. To show this fact, data were simulated in which participant and item
effects were distributed as exponentials. Estimates of σ2 for these simulations
were as good as those from simulations with normally-distributed effects.
3. What happens if the additivity assumption fails? The effects of items, peo-
ple, and lags are assumed to be additive; i.e., no interactions amongst these
factors exist. This explicit treatment of participant and item variation is far
more realistic than the implicit assumption made when data are averaged —
that there are no item, participant, or lag effects. Nonetheless, potential vio-
lations of additivity may affect the estimates of σ. The effects of violations in
additivity are examined fully after discussing Experiment 1, as the results guide
choices in simulation.
4. What happens if the underlying UVSD model is wrong? To show that the
model accurately measures asymmetry in general, data were generated from
Yonelinas’ (1994) dual-process model with participant and item effects on fa-
miliarity, and one recollection parameter (R) across all participants and items. I
ran 50 simulations in which the true value of R ranged from 0 to .6 in increments
of .012. Estimates of σ were obtained by fitting the UVSD model to these data.
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The corresponding estimates of σ are given approximately by σˆ = 1.02 + 2.8R
(this linear relationship accounted for 97% of the variance). Thus, σ serves as
a reasonable index of ROC asymmetry even when this asymmetry arises from
recollection rather than strength variance.
2.3 Model Restrictions and Comparisons
The goal on this chapter is to localize the source of ROC asymmetry. To do so, I
construct a set of sub-models that represent theoretically important restrictions on
the full hierarchical model developed above. The relationships among these models
are shown in Figure 2.6. The top-left model, denoted M1, is the full model presented
above. The label “PILσ” indicates that participants (P), items (I), and lags (L) have
variable effects and that σ is not constrained. The top-right model, denotedM2 is the
same as M1 but with the restriction that σ = 1. Models M3 and M4 posit no effect
of lag. Models M5 and M6 do not allow item or participant variability, respectively.
Models M7 and M8 do not allow for any surface variation. Models M3 through M6
are referred to as partial averaging models as they are equivalent to averaging data
over at least one surface variable. Models M7 and M8 are referred to as full averaging
models as they are equivalent to averaging over people, items, and lags.
Given the set of models in Figure 2.6, the question is which one provides the
best account of data. Assessing model fit is an active area of research, but the core
of all methods involves assessing 1) how well the model accounts for the data, and
2) how flexible, or complex, the model is. For many methods such as the Akaike
information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), model fit
is assessed as the deviance, which is defined as -2 times the log likelihood of the data
given the model and it’s estimated parameters. Assessing model complexity is far
less straightforward and characterizes the main difference between different model-fit
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statistics. For example, the AIC statistic incorporates a penalty term that is two
times the number of model parameters — the best-fitting model by AIC is the model
that best explains the data with the fewest number of parameters. The BIC statistic
incorporates a larger penalty for complexity, and this penalty is also a function of the
number of parameters.
The models considered here are hierarchical, that is, the parameters are not inde-
pendent of one another, but are treated as coming from a common parent distribution.
The result is that there is constraint in the model that is not reflected in the number
of parameters (see Section 2.2). This fact is made most obvious by considering that
whereas adding hierarchical structure clearly adds constraint, it also adds to the num-
ber of parameters (one parameter for each effect variance). Because complexity in
hierarchical models cannot be captured by the number of parameters, both AIC and
BIC are inappropriate for hierarchical model comparison. Instead, the models are
compared with the deviance information criterion (DIC, Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin,
& Linde, 2002). Like AIC and BIC, DIC is defined as the deviance, plus a penalty
term for model complexity. For DIC, however, the penalty term for complexity in-
corporates constraint from hierarchical structures by penalizing by the number of
effective parameters. If the hierarchical structure imposes no constraint (e.g., if there
is so much data that extreme estimates are not pulled in) then the number of effec-
tive parameters equals the number of parameters in the model. As the hierarchical
structures impose more constraint by shrinking parameter estimates toward one an-
other, the number of effective parameters decreases. If the pooling is so great that
the hierarchical structure makes all effect parameters be the same (e.g., σ2
α(n)
= 0)
then none of those parameters count toward the complexity penalty. DIC, like AIC,
is measured on a log-scale. Differences of 10 or more in DIC are interpreted as very
strong evidence for the model with the smaller DIC.
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M1: PILσ
DIC = 
    σ = 
0
1.36
M2: PIL
DIC = 
    σ = 
792
1
M3: PIσ
DIC = 
    σ = 
249
1.37
M4: PI
DIC = 
    σ = 
1061
1
M5: Pσ
DIC = 
    σ = 
4385
1.3
M6: Iσ
DIC = 
    σ = 
18659
1.31
M7: σ
DIC = 
    σ = 
21877
1.26
M8
DIC = 
    σ = 
22442
1
No Averaging
Partial Averaging
Full Averaging
Equal−VarianceUnequal−Variance
Figure 2.6: Relationships among the models. The labels for each model denote what
effects were included. For example, “M1 : PILσ” indicates that M1 includes effects
of participants (P), items (I), lags (L), and free variance (σ). All other models place
one or more restrictions on model M1. DIC values and estimates σˆ are from the fits
to Experiment 1. All DIC values are reported in reference to that of ModelM1; larger
DIC values denote a worse fit compared with that of Model M1.
2.4 Experiment 1
Experiment 1 is a large-scale confidence-rating recognition memory experiment in
which 97 participants were tested on 480 items. Although a 480-item test list is large,
the same length was used by Glanzer et al. (1999) who obtained a typical sensitivity
(dˆ′ = .94) and variance (σˆ = 1.28). If previous estimates of σ > 1.0 are confounded
with participant or item variability, then the estimate of σ from the hierarchical model
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(M1) is expected to be close to 1.0, and model M2 should fit equally as well as model
M1. Alternatively, if recognition memory ROC curves are truly asymmetric, then the
hierarchical model estimate of σ should be greater than 1.0.
2.4.1 Method
Participants
Ninety-seven University of Missouri students participated in Experiment 1 in return
for credit toward a course requirement.
Stimuli
The word pool for the experiment consisted of 480 words from the MRC psycholin-
guistic database (Coltheart, 1981). Words were between four and nine letters and
had a Kucera-Francis frequency of occurrence between 1 and 200 (Kucera & Francis,
1967). Study lists were constructed by randomly sampling 240 of these words and
there was a separate study list per participant. Test lists were composed of all 480
words. Presentation order was randomized at study and at test and across all par-
ticipants. A second word pool was used for practice items. These practice items did
not overlap with the main word pool.
Procedure
Participants began with a practice session in which they studied five items and made
confidence ratings to a subsequent 10-item test list of words. Following practice,
participants were presented the study list. Each word was displayed in the center of
the screen for 1850 ms, followed by a 250 ms blank period before the next word was
presented. Participants were told that their memory for the words would be tested.
To insure that participants attended to each word, they were required to read each
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out loud; compliance was monitored. Following study, participants completed the test
phase. Each item was presented on the screen and participants rated their confidence
using the ratings: “sure new”, “believe new”, “guess new”, “guess studied”, “believe
studied”, and “sure studied.”
2.5 Model Fits
2.5.1 Measuring Variance Components
All of the models in Figure 2.6 were fit to Experiment 1. The differences in DIC for
each model compared with that for model M1 are shown in the figure. As can be
seen, all submodels are inferior to the full model M1. This result indicates that not
only do participants, items, and lags contribute substantial variability, but that σ is
assuredly greater than 1.0.
Figure 2.7A shows the estimates of overall sensitivity d′ from each model. The
models with fixed σ (M2, M4, M8) lead to lower estimates of sensitivity d
′ than
those with free σ (M1, M3, M5, M6, M7). This pattern is expected because d
′ is
defined with reference to the new-item distribution. More interesting is the effect
of averaging. First, the more averaging, the lower the estimate of d′. This result
is also expected; Rouder and Lu (2005) note that averaging artifactually reduces
sensitivity estimates (see also Wickelgren, 1968). Second, and more importantly,
averaging leads to an underestimation of sampling error. For M1, the estimate of d
′
has a credible interval with a width of .28 (see error bar ‘i’). For M7, in contrast,
the credible interval width is .05 (see error bar ‘ii’). The former interval is accurate
while the latter is wrong. The reason for this underestimation in confidence intervals
with averaging is that systematic variation across items and participants includes
correlations in performance, which, in turn, reduces the effective sample size (see
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Clark, 1973; Rouder & Lu, 2005). Here, the reduction in standard error is severe and
leads researchers to have far too much confidence in a distorted estimate.
Figure 2.7B shows the estimates of σ. First, all models that have free parameter
σ indicate an estimate well above 1.0, validating the large DIC increase for equal
variance models in Figure 2.6. Second, averaging has only minimal effects, with
increased averaging associated with marginally smaller estimates.
In the example of averaging over hard and easy items in Chapter 1, I speculated
that averaging artifactually increases estimates of σ. This speculation is clearly wrong.
Why did the hierarchical model not provide a smaller estimate of σ than the aver-
aging methods? The answer lies in a comparison of participant and item variability
in mnemonic strength across the new and studied-item conditions. Estimates of this
variability for participants (σα,s, σα,n) and items (σβ,s, σβ,n) are shown in Figure 2.7C
(first four bars). Here we see that although there is substantial systematic item and
participant variability, it is similar in size across the new and studied-item conditions.
In the example in Chapter 1, in contrast, there was sizable variability for studied items
and none for new ones. Averaging data from the studied-item condition conflates es-
timates of process variability in the studied condition with studied-item variability.
Averaging data from the new-item condition conflates estimates of process variabil-
ity in the new condition with new-item variability. If both of these item-variability
sources are the same size, the degree of inflation is about the same in both condi-
tions. Because the estimate of σ reflects the ratio of studied-item strength variance
to new-item strength variance, averaging the data from both conditions inflates both
variances about equally, and their ratio σ is approximately preserved. Critically, this
pattern cannot be predicted a priori and could not have been discovered without the
hierarchical model analysis.
In the preceding section on psychometric properties, I addressed the possibility
of violations of the additivity of surface variation. The observed pattern, in which
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Figure 2.7: Model analyses. A: Estimates of d′ from the eight models. B: Estimates of
σ from the five unequal-variance models. Darker colors in A & B denote greater levels
of averaging. C: Estimates of standard deviations of participant effects (σα,n,σα,s) and
item effects (σβ,n,σβ,s) from model M1 (left), and item effects from model M9 which
does not include word-frequency effects (right). Error bars are 95% credible intervals.
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there are equal amounts of item and participant variability across conditions, provides
guidance for assessment. The worst-case scenario is that violations of additivity occur
only for studied items and not at all for new items, as this pattern of variability leads
to an artifactual overestimation of σ. To assess the implications, data were simulated
from the equal-variance model M2 with the addition of an interaction term to only
the studied-item distribution mean. This interaction was of the same magnitude as
the item effects themselves. Over 100 such simulations, the mean estimate of σ from
model M1 was 1.21, and 95% of estimates fell within 1.16 and 1.26. This estimate is
certainly too high, reflecting the fact that interactions enter only for studied items.
Even so, it is far lower than and cannot account for our finding of σ = 1.36. Thus,
even in this worst-case and highly implausible scenario, violations of additivity cannot
account for the degree of asymmetry present in ROCs.
2.5.2 The Structure of Lag, Participant, and Item Effects
Although model M1 was designed to measure ROC asymmetry, it is also useful for
assessing lag, participant, and item effects. I consider first the effect of lag on the mean
of the studied-item distribution. The DIC value of 249 for model M3 in Figure 2.6
indicates that lag does indeed have an effect. The estimated slope of the lag effect,
the amount of change in d(s) per one-item of lag, is γˆ = −.001. Although this number
is small, the effect of lag across all 717 levels on d′ is .717, which is quite large given
that the average sensitivity is d′ = 1.38. Even though there is a lag effect, this effect
does not have an appreciable influence on the estimate of σ (compare models M3 and
M1 in Figure 2.7B).
Participants and items also had significant effects on the new- and studied-item
distribution means. In model M1, dˆ
′ values for participants ranged from .12 to 2.44,
and those for items ranged from .21 to 3.60. Figure 2.8A shows a scatter plot in which
the participant effects in the studied condition are plotted as a function of those in
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Figure 2.8: Participant and item effects. A: Participant effects in the studied condi-
tion plotted as a function of those in the new condition. The positive correlation is a
response bias. B: Item effects in the studied condition plotted as a function of those
in the new condition. The negative correlation is a mirror effect. The solid line repre-
sents the word-frequency effects obtained from model M9 in which word-frequency is
linearly regressed onto item effects. C: Item effects in the studied condition plotted
as a function of those in the new condition after word frequency is partialed out. The
mirror effect seen in panel B is greatly attenuated.
the new condition. Figure 2.8B shows the same for items. For participants, there is a
positive relationship (r = .30, t(95) = 3.11) — people with higher strength in the new
condition have higher strength in the studied condition.1 As discussed previously, this
positive correlation indicates that, in addition to differences in sensitivity d′, people
primarily vary in overall response bias (see Figure 4.4). In contrast, items exhibit a
mirror effect: items that have higher strength in the new condition tend to have lower
strength in the studied condition (r = −.22,t(478) = 4.82).1
The ability to estimate item effects without distortion from averaging over par-
ticipants also allows for an examination of the effects of item characteristics. Here,
I highlight the effect of word frequency on mnemonic strength. Item effects for the
new and studied-item conditions are plotted as a function of word frequency in Fig-
ures 2.9A and 2.9B, respectively. As can be seen, there is a substantial mirror effect—
1It is not clear how to assess the statistical significance of this correlation. The associated t-value
is highly significant. Yet, interpreting this value assumes that the estimates are independent. In
this case, they are not as they are connected by a hierarchical structure. The current priors, which
assume independence, likely result in a bias toward attenuating correlations (see Rouder et al., 2007)
so that the interpretation of the t-value is, if anything, conservative.
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Figure 2.9: Word frequency effects. A & B: Item effects in the new and studied
conditions, respectively, plotted as a function of word frequency on a log scale. Lines
are non-parametric smooths (Cleveland, 1981).
increases in word-frequency are associated with increases in baseline strength (β
(n)
j )
and with decreases in studied strength (β
(s)
j ).
The finding of strong word-frequency effects raises two additional questions: 1.
Are there item effects in this data set above those from word-frequency? 2. If there are
such extra-word-frequency item effects, do they also exhibit a mirror-effect pattern?
To answer these questions, a version of modelM1, termed modelM9, was constructed
that includes word frequency as a covariate on item effects:
β
(n)
j ∼ Normal
(
φ(n)(fj − f0), ω2β,n
)
,
β
(s)
j ∼ Normal
(
φ(s)(fj − f0), ω2β,s
)
,
where φ(n) and φ(s) are slopes of the word frequency effect, fj is the logarithm of the
Kucera-Francis word frequency for the jth item and f0 is the mean of these log-word-
frequencies such that the sum of these terms is zero. These parameters are estimated
at φ(n) = .15 (CI95 = [.14, .16]), and φ
(s) = −.14 (CI95 = [−.15,−.12]), which confirms
the existence of a substantial frequency-based mirror effect.
The systematic item variability not accounted for by word frequency is given
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by ω2β,n and ω
2
β,s. These variances are useful for answering the first question about
extra-word-frequency item effects. Estimates of these variances are shown as the two
right-most bars in Figure 2.7C. The credible intervals are well above zero indicating
substantial extra-word-frequency item effects. In fact, only 25% of the systematic
item-level variance may be attributed to word-frequency; the remaining 75% is from
other factors.
The second question about whether these extra-word-frequency item effects ex-
hibit a mirror effect may be assessed by plotting item effects from model M9 (see
Figure 2.8C). Removing word-frequency effects greatly attenuates any item-level mir-
ror effect (r = −0.007, t(478) = .15). Whereas there is a mirror-effect for word-
frequency, there does not appear to be one for other item characteristics that are
orthogonal to word-frequency, even though these other characteristics account for a
substantial proportion of item variability. We note, however, that this failure to find
extra-word-frequency mirror effects may not generalize to other studies in which, for
example, stimuli have a larger range on these orthogonal item characteristics (e.g.,
word length). The mirror effect has been interpreted as supporting a likelihood basis
of decision making in which participants assess what their mnemonic strength would
have been if the item was or was not studied (Glanzer et al., 1993). The current
results indicate that participants may be able to make these calculations with regard
to word frequency but not, perhaps, with regard to other item characteristics that
are orthogonal to word-frequency.
2.6 Interpreting σ2
In the above analyses it was shown that, even in the absence of item variability, σˆ2 is
greater than 1.0. In the context of the UVSD model, in which strength distributions
are assumed to be normals, this result is interpreted to suggest that the variance of
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mnemonic strength is greater for studied items than for new items. Unfortunately,
however, the finding that σ2 > 1.0 provides no evidence that the variance of latent
mnemonic strength is different across the new and studied-item conditions unless
one is willing to strictly (i.e., not approximately) assume that underlying strength
distributions are normal. There is, however, no information to warrant this assump-
tion. This fact has been known for some time (e.g., Egan, 1975), however, some
researchers continue to champion the interpretation of σ2 as strength variance (e.g.,
Wixted, 2007). In this section I show why this interpretation is not tenable.
Figure 2.10A shows an equal-variance normal signal detection model; Figure 2.10C
shows the corresponding symmetric ROC curve. These normal distributions may be
exponentially transformed, producing the distributions in Figure 2.10B. These dis-
tributions, termed log-normal distributions (Johnson, Kotz, & Balakrishnan, 1994),
have the same shape but differ in their scales. Accordingly, the log-normal distribu-
tions in Figure 2.10B differ in both mean and variance. The ROC curve resulting
from the log-normal distributions is also shown in Figure 2.10C. That is, the equal-
variance normal model in Figure 2.10A and the unequal-variance log-normal model
in Figure 2.10B produce exactly the same symmetric ROC curve.
The invariance of ROC curves to monotonic transformations of the underlying
strength distributions holds generally. To illustrate why, consider the criterion in
Figure 2.10A drawn at 1.0. The area above this criterion for new and studied items
is 16% and 69%, respectively. These areas are the hit and false alarm rates for this
criterion, shown as the point in Figure 2.10C. The criterion for the log-normal model
in Figure 2.10B was generated by exponentiating the criterion from Figure 2.10A,
that is, e1 = 2.72. The area above this criterion for the log-normal model for new
and studied items is 16% and 69%, respectively. Because these areas are the same
as for the normal model, the point on the ROC in Figure 2.10C also shows the hit
and false alarm rates for the criterion in the log-normal model. As long as the same
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Figure 2.10: ROC curves are invariant to transformations of the underlying strength
distributions. A. An EVSD model. The vertical dashed line shows a criterion placed
at 1.0 on the strength space. B. A signal detection model constructed by exponenti-
ating the distributions in (A). These distributions are log-normal distributions with
the same shape and varying scale. The vertical dashed line is the criterion from (A)
on the exponentiated, exp(1). C. The ROC curve resulting from the signal detection
models in both (A) and (B). The point corresponds to the criterion drawn in (A) and
(B). D. A signal detection model in which strengths are distributed as gamma distri-
butions with the same shape and varying scales. E. A signal detection constructed by
taking the log of the distributions in (A). These distributions are log-gamma distri-
butions with equal variances and varying means (shifts). F. The ROC curve resulting
from the signal detection models in both (D) and (E).
transformation is applied to both the new and studied-item distributions, and the
criterion placed on that strength space, the area above the transformed criterion
under the transformed distributions is unchanged. Because there are an uncountable
number of monotonic transformations, any given ROC curve is perfectly compatible
with an uncountable number of signal detection models. The result is that ROC data
provide no information regarding the shape of underlying strength distributions (e.g.,
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normal vs. log-normal).
Figure 2.10D shows a signal detection model in which strengths are distributed
as gamma distributions with the same shape and varying scales. Figure 2.10E shows
a signal detection model that results from taking the logarithm of the gamma distri-
butions in Figure 2.10D. These distributions differ only in shift, and therefore have
the same variance. The resulting ROC curve for the signal detection models in Fig-
ure 2.10D and Figure 2.10E is shown in Figure 2.10F. This ROC curve is asymmetric,
even though the distributions in Figure 2.10E have the same variance.
Figure 2.10 provides an example of an unequal-variance signal detection model
that produces symmetric ROC curves (B), and an equal-variance model that produces
asymmetric ROC curves (E). These signal detection models have non-normal strength
distributions, and the figure clearly demonstrates that ROC asymmetry has nothing
to do with the variance of underlying strength distributions if they are not strictly
normal. Because ROC curves are incapable of providing evidence that strength dis-
tributions are normal, the finding that σˆ2 > 1.0 implies only that ROC asymmetry
exists. The fact that asymmetry remains in the above hierarchical analysis implies
that it is a feature of the mnemonic process, and not due to item variability.
There are several plausible models of recognition memory other than the UVSD
model developed above that can account for ROC asymmetry. Such models include
signal detection models that do not assume normal strength distributions, such as
the gamma model in Figure 2.10D, and the Yonelinas dual-process model. Because
these are non-linear models, in Chapter 3 I develop hierarchical versions of them that
account for participant and item variability. The models are then compared via DIC.
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Chapter 3
Hierarchical Dual- and
Single-Process Models of
Recognition Memory
In Chapter 2 a hierarchical version of UVSD was developed. Fitting this model to
a typical experiment revealed that ROC asymmetry is not an artifact of averaging
data over items, but rather, reflects a characteristic of the mnemonic system. The
goal of Chapter 3 is to develop and compare hierarchical models that account for
this asymmetry. Although a great deal of effort has been made to determine whether
the single-process (UVSD) or dual-process (DPSD) views provide a better account of
ROC data, no consensus has been reached. For example, in a recent review of the
literature, Yonelinas and Parks (2007) conclude:
The authors discuss the methodological issues involved in conducting and
analyzing ROC results. . . . The results indicate that there are at least
2 functionally distinct component/processes underlying recognition mem-
ory.
In another review published at the same time, and based largely on the same literature
as that used by Yonelinas & Parks, Wixted (2007) concludes:
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The unequal-variance signal-detection model and a dual-process thresh-
old/detection model, accurately describe the receiver operating character-
istic, . . ., and that literature is almost unanimous in its endorsement of
signal-detection theory.
How could such disparate conclusions be reached? The most obvious reason is that
the UVSD and DPSD models make very similar predictions for a given ROC curve. In
order to observe curves that are fit better by one model or another, it is necessary to
measure ROC curves across a range of accuracies. By using the hierarchical models,
such a range is obtained naturally by taking participant and item variability into
account. These models must account for how participants and items differ from one
another, making them easier to distinguish. Moreover, in previous studies the model
fits and fit statistics were distorted by averaging. This distortion is also avoided by
comparing hierarchical models. For these reasons, in this chapter hierarchical versions
of several single- and dual-process models are compared.
Because the purpose of the UVSD model developed in Chapter 2 was to provide
a simple estimate of ROC asymmetry, a single value of σ2 was assumed for all partic-
ipants and items. In this chapter a UVSD model is developed in which each person
and item has a unique value of σ2. Fitting this model to the data from Experiment 1
reveals that σ2 varies across people and items in a systematic way — sensitivity d′
and σ2 are positively correlated across people and items. A gamma signal detection
model is then developed that accounts for this relationship between sensitivity and
asymmetry without the need to specify two separate parameters for each person and
item. Following development of this true single-process model, the Yonelinas dual-
process model is expanded to simultaneously account for person and item variability.
These models are then compared using DIC.
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3.1 Extended Hierarchical UVSD Model
In a typical UVSD analysis, the model is fit separately to each condition. In doing
so, the majority of previous studies have found that conditions exhibiting higher
sensitivity, d′, also have higher values of σ2. For example, in both meta-analysis
and their own series of experiments, Glanzer et al. (1999) found that manipulations
of study time, word frequency, encoding task at study, and several other variables
affected both d′ and σ2. Likewise, in a meta-analysis Yonelinas and Parks (2007)
found a positive correlation between d′ and σ2 across several different studies. Given
the plausibility of this relationship between conditions and even experiments, it is
reasonable to ask two questions: 1) Whether σ2 varies across people and items, and
2) If so, whether there is a positive relationship between d′ and σ2 across people
and items. To answer these questions, in this section an extended UVSD model is
constructed that allows σ2 to vary across participants and items. Experiment 1 is
then analyzed with this extended UVSD model.
3.1.1 Model Specification
In the extended UVSD model each participant and item is allowed a unique value of
σ2 such that latent strengths Xij are distributed as follows:
Xij ∼
 Normal(d
(n)
ij , 1) new,
Normal(d
(s)
ij , σ
2
ij) studied,
This extended UVSD model (E-UVSD) is identical to the UVSD model presented in
Chapter 2 in that each person and item has a unique d
(n)
ij and d
(s)
ij that are additive
combinations of a grand mean, a participant effect, an item effect, and a lag effect
for d
(s)
ij . Also, the middle criterion is fixed to zero and the remaining criteria are
free to vary across participants. The model differs from that in Chapter 2 in that
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the studied-item variance σ2 is not fixed, but rather, it’s logarithm is the additive
combination of a participant, item, and lag effect:
log(σ2ij) = µ
(σ) + α
(σ)
i + β
(σ)
j + θ
(σ)lij,
where µ(σ) is a grand mean, α
(σ)
i are participant effects, β
(σ)
j are item effects, and θ
(σ)
is the effect of the lij lag. The additive model is placed on the logarithm of σ
2 to
ensure that it is positive for all person by item combinations. As with the effects on
d
(n)
ij and d
(s)
ij , effects on σ
2
ij are given hierarchical normal structures:
α
(σ)
i ∼ Normal(0, σ2α(σ)),
β
(σ)
j ∼ Normal(0, σ2β(σ)).
If all people have the same value of σ2, then all estimates of α
(σ)
i will be near zero,
as will σ2
α(σ)
. Likewise, if all items have the same value of σ2 then σ2
β(σ)
will be near
zero. Assessing the estimates of these effect variances will provide a test of whether
it is necessary to allow people and items to have varying values of σ2.
3.1.2 Model Analysis
Analysis of the extended UVSD model is similar to that for the UVSD model devel-
oped in Chapter 2. The only exceptions concern the posterior distributions of d
(s)
ij
and σ2ij. Studied-item latent data for the extended UVSD model is distributed as
follows:
ω
(s)
ij ∼ Normal(d(s)ij , σ2ij),
and the goal is to sample the additive components in d
(s)
ij and log(σ
2
ij) given these
latent data. Let ν2ij = log(σ
2
ij). The full log conditional posterior distribution of the
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additive components in d
(s)
ij and ν
2
ij is
−1
2
 I∑
i=0
J∑
j=0
µ(σ) + α(σ)i + β(σ)j + θ(σ)lij +
(
wij − µ(s) − α(s)i − β(s)j − θ(s)lij
)2
e(µ
(σ)+α
(σ)
i +β
(σ)
j +θ
(σ)lij)

+
(µ(s))2
σ20
+
(α
(s)
i )
2
σ2α,s
+
(β
(s)
j )
2
σ2β,s
+
(θ(s))2
σ20
+
(µ(σ))2
σ20
+
(α
(σ)
i )
2
σ2α,σ
+
(β
(σ)
j )
2
σ2β,σ
+
(θ(σ))2
σ20
]
The grand mean and effects on d
(s)
ij have the following normal conditional posterior
distributions:
f(µ(s)|...) ∼ N(m, v)
v =
(
I∑
i=0
J∑
j=0
(e−ν
2
ij) +
1
σ20
)−1
m = v
I∑
i=0
J∑
j=0
wij − α(s)i − β(s)j − θ(s)lij
eν
2
ij
f(α
(s)
i |...) ∼ N(m, v)
v =
(
I∑
i=0
J∑
j=0
(e−ν
2
ij) +
1
σ2α,s
)−1
m = v
I∑
i=0
J∑
j=0
wij − µ(s) − β(s)j − θ(s)lij
eν
2
ij
f(β
(s)
j |...) ∼ N(m, v)
v =
(
I∑
i=0
J∑
j=0
(e−ν
2
ij) +
1
σ2β,s
)−1
m = v
I∑
i=0
J∑
j=0
wij − µ(s) − α(s)i − θ(s)lij
eν
2
ij
f(θ(s)|...) ∼ N(m, v)
v =
(
I∑
i=0
J∑
j=0
(l2ije
−ν2ij) +
1
σ20
)−1
m = v
I∑
i=0
J∑
j=0
lij(wij − µ(s) − α(s)i − β(s)j )
eν
2
ij
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Conditional posteriors of the grand mean and effects on ν2 can be simplified from
the full conditional, but do not have distributions with known forms and so are sam-
pled independently with random-walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithms. To mitigate
autocorrelation inherent in additive models, the effects on d
(s)
ij and on ν
2
ij are given
Metropolis-Hastings decorrleating steps.
3.1.3 Model Performance
To assess parameter recoverability for the extended UVSD model, data were gener-
ated from the E-UVSD model and fit with it. The design matrix, true grand means,
criteria, and effect variances were taken from the E-UVSD analysis of Experiment 1,
presented below. Figure 3.1 shows parameter estimates as a function of their true val-
ues. Clearly, the model is capable of recovering true parameters, including participant
and item effects on σ2ij.
3.1.4 E-UVSD Fit to Experiment 1
The extended UVSD model was fit to the data from Experiment 1. There are two
primary questions regarding this fit: 1) Does σ2 vary across participants and items,
and 2) If so, is there a relationship between these effects and those on sensitivity.
These questions are answered in turn below.
Variability in σ2
There are two (related) ways to assess whether participant and item effects on σ2
are necessary. The first is by assessing model fit with DIC. The UVSD model in
Chapter 2 with a single value of σ2 across participants and items(M1) had a DIC
value that was 872 points higher than the extended model presented above. That
is, DIC overwhelming favors participant and item variability in σ2. The extended
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Figure 3.1: Parameter recovery of the E-UVSD model. Data were simulated from the
extended UVSD model, and fit with it. All panels show estimated effects as a function
of their true values. A. Participant effects on new-item mean. B. Participant effects
on studied-item mean. C. Participant effects on log(σ2). D. Item effects on new-item
mean. E. Item effects on studied-item mean. F. Item effects on log(σ2).
model has 1721 effective parameters, whereas the single-σ2 model has only 1359 —
DIC favors the more complex model as the gain in fit outweighs the gain in flexibility
as assessed by the number of effective parameters.
As an alternative to DIC, we can examine the posterior distributions of effect
variance; if effects are absent then these variances should be near 0. Figure 3.2 shows
the posterior distributions of σ2
α(σ)
and σ2
β(σ)
, the size of participant and item effects
on σ2, respectively. That the mass of both distributions is substantially greater than
0.0 suggests that σ2
α(σ)
> 0 and σ2
β(σ)
> 0. Although both participant and item effects
are needed on σ2, the greater posterior distribution of σ2
β(σ)
over σ2
α(σ)
suggests that
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Figure 3.2: Posterior distributions of participant effects on σ2, σ2
α(σ)
(solid line) and
item effects on σ2, σ2
β(σ)
(dashed line). That the mass of both distributions lies sub-
stantially above zero indicates that there is participant and item variability in σ2.
there is more item variability in σ2 than participant variability.
Relationship between σ2 and strength
The top panels of Figure 3.3 show participant effects on σ2 as a function of participant
effects on sensitivity d′ (panel A), new-item strength α(n) (panel B), and studied-item
strength α(s) (panel C). The bottom panels of Figure 3.3 show the same for items.
Clearly there is a positive relationship between sensitivity d′ and σ2 for both people
and items. Examining this relationship between σ2 and the new- and studied-item
components reveals a negative relationship between σ2 and new-item strength for both
participants and items. These correlations are significant by Pearson correlation tests
for both participants (r=-.48, t=5.3) and items (r=-.64, t=18.1). The relationship
between σ2 and studied-item strength is absent for participants (r=-.12, t=1.2), and
positive for items (r=.44, t=10.8). Because sensitivity d′ is defined as d(s)−d(n), these
findings are perfectly in line with previous demonstrations that there is a positive
correlation between σ2 and d′ across conditions. The re-parametrized model used
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here, however, reveals that this correlation is primarily driven by the relationship
between σ2 and new-item strength.
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Figure 3.3: Relationship between σ2 and strength. A. Participant effects on σ2 as
a function of sensitivity d′ defined as d(s)i − d(n)i . B. Participant effects on σ2 as a
function of those on new-item strength. C. Participant effects on σ2 as a function
of those on studied-item strength. D. Item effects on σ2 as a function of sensitivity
d′ defined as d(s)j − d(n)j . E. Item effects on σ2 as a function of those on new-item
strength. F. Item effects on σ2 as a function of those on studied-item strength.
It is reasonable to wonder whether the patterns in Figure 3.3 reflect real data
patterns, or artifacts of estimation. In the E-UVSD simulation presented above, par-
ticipant and item effects were generated from independent normals, and so the true
correlations between these effects on strength and σ2 were zero. The estimated cor-
relation between studied-item strength and σ2 was .16 for participant effects, and .01
for item effects. Critically, the estimated correlation between new-item strength and
σ2 was -.06 for participant effects, and .03 for item effects. None of these correlations
was significant, suggesting that the correlation found for the experimental data is not
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an artifact of estimation.
There are several possible interpretations of this correlation. At the level of ROC
curves, however, the implication is simply that as sensitivity increases, so does ROC
asymmetry. Rather than allow both d′ and σ2 to be free parameters for every partic-
ipant and item to account for asymmetry, then, it should be possible to construct a
signal detection model such that the relationship between sensitivity and ROC asym-
metry is built in. Such a model, using gamma strength distributions, is constructed
in the next section.
3.2 Gamma Signal Detection Model
Results of the extended UVSD model fit to Experiment 1 imply that ROC asymmetry
is a function of sensitivity. The downside of the extended UVSD model is that is has
lost any respectable resemblance to a single-process model. As Figure 1.5 in Chapter 1
shows, allowing strength variances to differ results in a loss of the structure in ROC
space that makes EVSD such a parsimonious model. If people, items, and conditions
all affect two parameters (d′ and σ2), this increase in flexibility must imply more
complexity than a 1-process model. In this section I show that there are single-process
signal detection models that can predict a relationship between ROC asymmetry and
d′ without the need to posit two parameters such as in UVSD. This feature is gained
by forgoing the assumption that strength distributions are normal. Since, as I showed
in Chapter 2, the normality assumption is completely unwarranted, studying other
options provides a promising path toward a single-process model that accounts for
variability in ROC asymmetry.
There are several choices of strength distribution that will provide a relationship
between d′ and ROC asymmetry (see, e.g., DeCarlo, 1998). In the model developed
here, latent strengths are distributed as gamma distributions rather than as normal
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distributions. The effect of study is to increase the scale of the distribution; partici-
pants set criteria on the latent space as before. Because this is a non-linear model, I
develop a hierarchical version that accounts for participant and item variability.
3.2.1 Model Specification
Figure 3.4A shows the hierarchical gamma signal detection (GSD) model. Latent
mnemonic strengths are:
Xij ∼
 Gamma(2, λ
(n)
ij ) new,
Gamma(2, λ
(s)
ij ) studied.
The shapes of both gamma distributions are fixed to 2.0. This value was chosen not
for any deep theoretical reasons but simply because gamma distributions with this
shape provide about the right degree of asymmetry. To fix the scale of the space, the
middle criterion is fixed to 1.0, and, as in UVSD, the remaining criteria are free to
vary across participants. The scales of the new and studied-item distributions, λ
(n)
ij
and λ
(s)
ij , respectively, are free to vary across participants and items. Sensitivity in
the gamma model may be defined as the ratio of studied to new-item scales d′ij =
λ
(s)
ij /λ
(n)
ij . Additive models are placed the log of scale parameters so that these scales
are restricted to be positive:
log(λ
(n)
ij ) = µ
(n) + α
(n)
i + β
(n)
j ,
log(λ
(s)
ij ) = µ
(s) + α
(s)
i + β
(s)
j + θ
(s)lij.
These random effects are given the same hierarchical structures used previously in
UVSD.
Figure 3.4B shows GSD ROC curves for several levels of sensitivity. As can be seen,
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Figure 3.4: The gamma signal detection model. A. The structure of the hierarchical
GSD model. B. Predicted GSD ROC curves for several levels of sensitivity d′.
the curves produce a similarly structured field as EVSD (see Figure 1.3), however,
they are asymmetric. If these lines were fit with UVSD, there would be a positive
correlation between d′ and σ2. Thus, the relationship between d′ and σ2 seen in the
E-UVSD analysis is built into GSD without any gain in complexity over EVSD.
It may seem that the gamma distribution is a rather arbitrary choice for a signal
detection model. Indeed it is. This insight, however, applies to the normal as well —
there is no real reason to chose the normal distribution over alternatives (see Egan,
1975; Lockhart & Murdock, 1970; Rouder, Pratte, & Morey, in press). The gamma
is superior a priori to the normal on pragmatic grounds. It explains the asymmetry
in the data while predicting constrained and orderly ROC fields. Therefore, it is a
reasoned alternative worthy of study. Moreover, the gamma signal detection model,
unlike UVSD, is clearly a single-process model — the effect of study is in one pa-
rameter. It would, therefore, serve as a more reasonable competitor to dual-process
models than UVSD does.
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3.2.2 Model Analysis
Latent data for GSD are posited exactly as in UVSD except that they are distributed
as gamma distributions with shape 2:
wij ∼
 Gamma(2, λ
(n)
ij ), New,
Gamma(2, λ
(s)
ij ), Studied.
and with conditional posteriors that are truncated gammas rather than truncated
normals. I present here the conditional log posterior distribution of the components
for the studied-item scales. Those for the new-item scales are equivalent, and criteria
are sampled as they are in UVSD.
I∑
i=0
J∑
j=0
[
−w(s)ij
e
“
µ(s)+α
(s)
i +β
(s)
j +θ
(s)lij
” − 2(µ(s) + α(s)i + β(s)j + θ(s)lij)
]
−1
2
(
(µ(s))2
σ20
+
(α
(s)
i )
2
σ2α,s
+
(β
(s)
j )
2
σ2β,s
+
(θ(s))2
σ20
)
The conditional posteriors of participant and item effects on new and studied-item
scales have no known form, and so are sampled with Metropolis-Hastings random
walk algorithms, and effects are de-correlated using the same methods as for the
UVSD effects. This model can be fit with the R package hbmem with the function
sampleGamma().
The GSDmodel performs very well in simulation; as good as equal-variance normal
signal detection. The fit of the GSD model to Experiment 1 is explored in the
Model Comparison section below, following development of a hierarchical dual-process
model.
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3.3 Hierarchical Dual-Process Model
3.3.1 Model Specification
The hierarchical version of the Yonelinas’ dual-process signal detection model is shown
in Figure 3.5. The structure of the EVSD component governing familiarity is identical
to that developed in Chapter 2. As before, the means of the new and studied-item
distributions are the additive combinations of participant and item effects, and all but
the middle criteria are free to vary across participants. In the hierarchical version,
recollection, Rij, varies across participants, items, and lags. Recollection can not
be estimated for every participant-by-item combination without constraint. Additive
structures are placed on the probit transformation of recollection (i.e., the quantile
function of the standard normal):
Φ−1(Rij) = µ(r) + α
(r)
i + β
(r)
j θ
(r)lij,
where µ(r) is a grand mean, α
(r)
i are participant effects, β
(r)
j are item effects, and θ
(r)
is the linear effect of lag. As with UVSD, these participant and item effects are given
normal parent distributions:
α
(r)
i ∼ Normal(0, σ2α(r)),
β
(r)
j ∼ Normal(0, σ2β(r)).
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Figure 3.5: Graphical representation of the hierarchical dual-process model. Each
participant and item has a unique d(n), d(s), and probability of recollection R.
3.3.2 Model Analysis
According to the hierarchical dual-process model, the probability that the ith person
makes the kth response to the jth item is:
Pr(yij = k| new) = Φ
(
d
(n)
ij − cik
)
− Φ
(
d
(n)
ij − ci(k−1)
)
,
Pr(yij = k ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1}| studied) = (1−Rij)
[
Φ
(
d
(s)
ij − cik
)
− Φ
(
d
(s)
ij − ci(k−1)
)]
,
Pr(yij = K| studied) = Rij + (1−Rij) Φ
(
ci(K−1) − d(s)ij
)
,
As with UVSD, sampling from conditional posteriors is made easier by conditioning
on latent data rather than the multinomal data. For the new-item condition, latent
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data are sampled exactly as they are in the hierarchical EVSD model.
ω
(n)
ij | . . . ∼ TN(ci(yij−1),ci(yij))(d
(n)
ij , 1).
In addition to sampling latent data for the signal detection components, latent data
are sampled for recollection in the manner common for estimating linear models
on binomial probabilities (Albert & Chib, 1995). These latent data, denoted ω
(r)
ij ,
are positive on trials for which recollection occurred and negative otherwise. On
trials for which the response was not equal to K (i.e., not “sure studied”) recollection
assuredly did not occur and so the response must have arisen from the signal detection
component. For these trials the mapping between multinomial and latent data is as
follows:
ω
(s)
ij | . . . ∼ TN(Ci(yij−1),Ci(yij))
(
d
(s)
ij , 1
)
ω
(r)
ij | . . . ∼ TN(−∞,0) (φ−1(Rij), 1)
 yij 6= K
Responses to studied items equal to K (“sure studied”) could have arisen from recol-
lection or from familiarity that was above the K−1 criterion. If recollection occurred
(i.e., ω
(r)
ij ≥ 0) then we have no information about familiarity. Alternatively, if rec-
ollection did not occur (ω
(r)
ij < 0) then familiarity must have been above the K − 1
criterion:
ω
(s)
ij | . . . ∼ N
(
d
(s)
ij , 1
)
, ω
(r)
ij ≥ 0
ω
(s)
ij | . . . ∼ TN(CiK ,∞)
(
d
(s)
ij , 1
)
, ω
(r)
ij < 0
 yij = K
In a similar manner, if familiarity was above the highest criterion then we have no
information about whether recollection occurred or did not. Alternatively, if famil-
iarity is below the K − 1 criterion and yet the response is K, then recollection must
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have occurred:
ω
(r)
ij | . . . ∼ N (φ−1(Rij), 1) , ω(s)ij ≥ Ci(K−1)
ω
(r)
ij | . . . ∼ TN(0,∞) (φ−1(Rij), 1) , ω(s)ij < Ci(K−1)
 yij = K
The latent data ω
(n)
ij , ω
(s)
ij , and ω
(r)
ij are normally distributed with unit variance and
means d
(n)
ij , d
(s)
ij , and φ
−1(Rij), respectively. Sampling the additive components con-
ditioned on these normally-distributed data is straightforward. Criteria are sampled
with a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm as they are in the UVSD model.
Like EVSD, UVSD, and GSD, the hierarchical dual-process model may be esti-
mated with the R package hbmem. The function dpsdSim() generates data from the
hierarchical DPSD model, and the function dpsdSample() fits the hierarchical DPSD
model to data.
3.3.3 Model Performance
To assess performance of the hierarchical DPSD model, data were generated from the
model with the design matrix, grand means, criteria, and effect variances the same as
those from the fit of the model to Experiment 1 (below). Figure 3.6 shows estimates
of effect parameters as a function of their true values. Clearly the model is highly
capable of recovering parameter values.
3.3.4 DPSD Fit to Experiment 1
There are two critical questions regarding the fit of the hierarchical DPSD model to
Experiment 1: 1) Does recollection vary across people and items, and 2) Is there a
relationship between recollection and familiarity, as there was between d′ and σ2 in
the UVSD fit. To answer the first question, posterior distributions of σ2
α(r)
and σ2
β(r)
are shown in Figure 3.7. All of the mass of both distributions lies substantially above
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Figure 3.6: Parameter recovery for the hierarchical dual-process signal detection
model. Data were generated from the hierarchical DPSD model and these data were
fit with the hierarchical DPSD model. Panels A, B, & C show estimated participant
effects as a function of their true values for the new-item mean, studied-item mean,
and recollection, respectively. Panels D, E, & F show the same for items.
zero suggesting that there is both participant and item variability in recollection.
Both distributions are also very similar, suggesting that the magnitude of participant
variability in recollection is similar to that of item variability.
The second question concerns the relationship between familiarity and recollection.
Figure 3.8 shows how recollection and familiarity covary. Figure 3.8A shows the
scatter plot for participant effects on recollection as a function of participant effects
on sensitivity, where the later is given by α
(s)
i −α(n)i . Figure 3.8D shows the same for
items. As can be seen, there is a positive relationship. Figures 3.8B and 3.8E show
the scatter plots for recollection and new-item or baseline familiarity; Figures 3.8C
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Figure 3.7: Posterior distributions of participant effects on recollection, σ2
α(r)
(solid
line) and item effects on recollection, σ2
β(r)
(dashed line). That the mass of both
distributions lies substantially above zero indicates that recollection varies across
both participants and items.
and 3.8F show the same for studied-item familiarity. Almost all of the relationship
between sensitivity d′ and recollection is reflected in baseline familiarity d(n). Items
that pre-experimentally have less familiarity tend to be recollected at higher rates.
One explanation of the relationship between recollection and baseline familiarity is
the obvious: items that pre-experimentally have less familiarity tend to be recollected
at higher rates. An alternative explanation is that the model is mis-specified and the
correlation reflects an un-modeled high-threshold component for new items, perhaps
from a recollect-to-reject model (Rotello, Macmillan, & Van Tassel, 2000). Another
explanation is that recognition memory is mediated by a single-process model, and
the over-specification of the dual-process model manifests as correlations among pa-
rameters. As an analogy, consider reaction time distributions, which, when they
differ, almost always differ in both mean and variance (E. J. Wagenmakers & Brown,
2007). A single-process account of this effect is a scale effect such as the Gamma
distributions that differ in scale in Figure 3.4A — when the scale of the gamma dis-
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Figure 3.8: Correlations between DPSD effects in recollection and familiarity. A.
Participant effects in recollection as a function of those in sensitivity d′. B. Partic-
ipant effects in recollection as a function of those in new-item (baseline) familiarity.
The solid line is the estimated linear relationship from the DPSD model in which
recollection is forced to be a linear function of baseline familiarity. C. Participant
effects in recollection as a function of those in studied-item familiarity. Panels D-F
show the same relationships for item effects.
tribution changes, both its mean and variance change. Alternatively, reaction time
data may be fit with normal distributions that differ in both mean and variance. This
2-parameter solution is over-specified if the data were generated from a model such as
gamma distributions, but this over-specification will manifest as correlations between
the mean and variance parameters of the normal distributions. In a similar vein, the
correlations between recollection and familiarity may imply that we are throwing two
parameters at data that were generated from one. This possibility is explored further
in the next section and in chapter 4.
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3.4 Model Comparison
In this section the ability of UVSD, DPSD, and GSD models to account for the data
in Experiment 1 are compared. One of the main goals of the model comparisons
herein is discriminating between UVSD and DPSD. I assessed how well this can be
performed with DIC via simulation. Data were generated by both hierarchical UVSD
and DPSD models with the true values based on model fits to Experiment 1. Each
simulated data set was fit with both UVSD and DPSD, and the DIC difference was
calculated. Histograms of these differences are shown in Figure 3.9. Clearly the
DIC statistic accurately discriminates between data generated from the two models.
Although this approach is not as extensive as the bootstrap assessment offered by E. J.
Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, Gomez, and Iverson (2004), it provides confidence that these
models are indeed discriminable with sample sizes such as those in Experiment 1.
Figure 3.10 shows the twelve models that were fit to the data from Experiment 1.
Table 1 shows DIC statistics for each model. The DIC value for each model is the
difference between that model’s DIC value and the DIC value for the DPSD model
developed above. The main comparison of interest is between the signal-detection
models (left branch) and the dual-process models (right branch). Within each class
of models there are several sub-models that may be considered (lines in Figure 3.10
denote these nested relationships). These comparisons are considered in turn below.
DPSD is selected over alternatives
Every DPSD model was preferred to its corresponding UVSD counterpart. This
trend holds regardless of restriction. DPSD also outperformed the EVSD and gamma
single-process alternatives.
81
∆DIC
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
−1500 −1000 −500 0 500 1000 1500
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
From UVSD
From DPSD
Figure 3.9: Discriminating between UVSD and DPSD as generating model. Data were
simulated from the hierarchical UVSD model (100 simulations) or the hierarchical
DPSD model (100 simulations) with grand means and effect variances set to those
estimated in the experiment. For each simulation the difference in DIC (∆DIC)
between the UVSD and DPSD model fits was calculated such that negative values
indicate that UVSD provides a better fit. The histogram of ∆DIC from these 200
simulations shows that when the data were generated from UVSD (white) DIC prefers
the UVSD model; when the data were generated from DPSD (grey) DIC prefers the
DPSD model.
The dependence of recollection on familiarity
The best-fitting model was the general DPSD model with random effects. As shown
previously, the participant and item effects on recollection are highly correlated with
those on familiarity for this model (see Figure 3.8). The existence of this relationship
may imply that recognition memory is mediated by a single process, and the dual-
process model is over-fitting the data. If this is the case, then it should be possible to
construct a dual-process model that assumes a relationship between recollection and
sensitivity.
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Figure 3.10: Relationships between models. Lines denote nested relationships.
Shaded boxes denote the best-fitting DPSD model (right) and best-fitting UVSD
model (left). Boxes with hatched lines denote models comparable to typical analysis.
Table 3.1: Model Selection Statistics
Model DIC Statistics
Family Effects Restriction ∆DIC† Deviance Penalty
DPSD Random - 0 128732 1716
DPSD Fixed - 134 128633 1948
UVSD Random - 137 128864 1721
UVSD Fixed - 316 128727 2036
DPSD Random R ∝ d(n) 722 129838 1331
UVSD Random one σ2 1009 130098 1359
GSD Random - 1016 130101 1363
EVSD Random σ2 = 1 1799 130886 1361
DPSD Random no items 5300 135137 610
DPSD Fixed no items 5327 135135 639
UVSD Random no items 5344 135182 609
UVSD Fixed no items 5377 135163 662
†DIC is Deviance + Penalty - DIC for DPSD random effects model.
Based on the relationship between recollection and baseline familiarity in Fig-
ure 3.8, a DPSD model was constructed in which recollection was a linear function of
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baseline familiarity:
Φ−1(Rij) = µ(r) + φαα
(n)
i + φββ
(n)
j ,
where φα and φβ are the linear slopes relating the new-item strength effects to the
recollection effects for participants and items, respectively. The lines in the middle
panels of Figure 3.8 are from this restricted model with estimated slopes of φα =
−1.03 and φβ = −1.49. Although this linear model provides a good account of the
relationship, the DIC value (see Table 1, restriction R ∝ d(n)) suggests that the
decrement in fit is not offset by the gain in parsimony when compared to the general
DPSD model. The conclusion is that although baseline familiarity and recollection
are substantially related, a deterministic linear relationship is not sufficient.
Random vs. Fixed Effects
In the all of the models developed in Chapters 2 & 3, participant and item effects
were treated as random effects, and their variances were estimated parameters. This
hierarchical modeling approach is preferred as it allows generalization of effects to
other samples of people and items, and provides for more constrained models. Another
option, however, is to treat participant and item effects as fixed effects. To do so the
variances of these effects (e.g., σ2
β(σ)
) are fixed at some value. In this fixed-effects case,
the normal distributions on effects serve as prior distributions, and their variances
are chosen to be large so that they have negligible effects on parameter estimates.
Although random-effects models are often assumed, I digress here to explore fixed-
effects versions of UVSD and DPSD, and compare these with their random-effects
counterparts to asses the effect of hierarchical pooling.
As can be seen in Table 1, models with random effects are selected over models
with fixed effects. This trend holds for both DPSD and UVSD, and both when item
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effects are included and when they are excluded. The DIC statistics reveal that the
advantage of the random-effect models is not in fit. Naturally, fixed-effect models
fit better as they are less constrained. The DIC penalty terms reveal, however, that
the gain in parsimony for treating people and item effects as samples from parent
distributions more than offsets the loss in fit.
To better explicate the constraint in random effects modeling, participant and
item effect estimates from the random-effects model are plotted as a function of those
from the fixed-effects model. Figure 3.11 shows the case for the UVSD model, and the
displayed trends are similar for DPSD. The main difference between random and fixed
effects is at the extremes — random effect estimates are less extreme than their fixed
effect counterparts. This trend reflects the natural correlate of assuming these effects
are from a common parent distribution with normal tails. The interpretation from
the random effects model is that the extremes in fixed-effect estimates are elements of
over-fitting. The constraint in random effects is expressed as a shrinkage of extreme
estimates to group means. This shrinkage effect is greatest for item estimates (bottom
row) because there are many more items than participants. The shrinkage is also
greater for studied-item parameters than new-item parameters because the effect of
study is modeled in two parameters (d(s), σ2) rather than in one (d(n)).
The presence of item effects
In previous sections I showed that according to DIC, there is substantial participant
and item variability in both σ2 in UVSD and in recollection in the dual-process
model. Two important questions remain concerning item effects: 1) should item
effects be included in the models at all, and 2) is accounting for item effects driving
the advantage of DPSD over UVSD? To answer both questions fixed- and random-
effect UVSD and DPSD models without any item effects or lag effects were fit to
Experiment 1.
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Figure 3.11: Comparing fixed and random effect estimates from the UVSD fit to the
experiment. A. Participant effects on the new-item mean from the random-effects
model as a function of those from the fixed-effects model. B.. Participant effects on
the studied-item mean from the random-effects model as a function of those from the
fixed-effects model. C. Participant effects on σ2 from the random-effects model as
a function of those from the fixed-effects model. Panels D, E, & F show the same
relationships for item effects.
The typical approach to fitting the UVSD and DPSD models is to average data
over items to produce participant-specific effects. Averaging implicitly assumes that
there are no item or lag effects. To mimic averaging, I implemented DPSD with item
and lag effects in d
(n)
ij , d
(s)
ij , and Rij set to 0. The fixed-effects version of this no-item
effects restriction is the closest Bayesian analog of the typical analysis, and is shown
in Figure 3.10 as the box with hatched lines.
These analyses, which are comparable to averaging data over items, are shown
in the last four rows of Table 1. Item effects are so prevalent that models without
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item effects perform worse than EVSD (with item effects). This last comparison is
important because EVSD has been considered insufficient for recognition memory for
over three decades.
Results for the models without item effects make it evident that the inclusion of
item effects is not driving the selection of DPSD over UVSD. Consider the comparison
of the general models vs. the comparison of models without item effects. For the
former, the DIC favors DPSD by 137; for the later, DIC favors DPSD by 44. The
difference in these comparisons highlights that one of the advantages of modeling
items is that it facilitates model selection. When accounting for items, the data are
more rich (greater numbers of degrees of freedom) and the models are more complex.
The balance, however, is that model mis-specification of structural properties becomes
more apparent and so model selection is easier.
3.5 Conclusion
The results show some of the advantages of taking into account item and participant
effects while modeling recognition memory performance. The substantive conclusion
offered here is that the dual-process signal detection model outperforms the others.
This result, however, should not prompt an overwhelming acceptance of DPSD. The
following caveats are offered to aid in the judicious interpretation of the results.
The focus of this chapter has been on statistical modeling rather than on explor-
ing the best manipulations to test theoretical positions. The DPSD model would be
more convincing if one could selectively influence key parameters, especially while ac-
counting for participant and item variation. Several researchers have made convincing
arguments that previous demonstrations of selective influence are methodologically
or conceptually flawed (Dunn, 2008; Wixted, 2007; Yonelinas & Parks, 2007). In
Chapter 4, the hierarchical models developed above are used to offer a principled and
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powerful approach to assessing selective influence.
A second caveat is rooted in the substantial relationships in DPSD parameter esti-
mates. Recollection is correlated with baseline familiarity, suggesting that familiarity
and recollection may not be that distinct. There are several possible reasons for this
dependence that retain the spirit of the dual-process model. For example, the corre-
lation may reflect a mispecification of modeling recollection as a single high-threshold
process; instead the pattern may indicate a recollect-to-reject component. Alterna-
tively, the correlation may be diagnostic of a single-process structure. The challenge
from this point of view is to explain why the model with the linear constraint fared
worse than the general model. One possibility is that the wrong transforms were
chosen for regression. In the DPSD model, recollection parameters enter through a
probit transform and familiarity is assumed to be normally distributed. Both of these
choices are arbitrary and perhaps other choices would reduce the noise in the scatter
plots of Figure 3.11. The ability to detect mis-specification in transform increases
as the data span larger ranges in accuracy. Though these ranges are large in our
experiments, they may be made even larger through manipulation. In Chapter 4,
such larger ranges of accuracy are obtained.
A third caveat reflects the nature of DIC as a model selection statistic. DIC has as
a benefit that it reflects constraint from hierarchical structure. One downside is that
it does not reflect this constraint in a consistent manner. As discussed in Chapter 2,
DIC does not appropriately penalize complexity as sample size increases. DIC is
most useful for selecting across models of relatively comparable complexity, such as
between comparable UVSD and DPSD models. The DIC evaluation of nested models
with large differences in effective parameters and with large sample sizes, as we have
here, are cause for concern. As noted, DIC is based on the same logic as AIC, and
as a consequence, overstates the evidence against nested submodels. In this regard,
the selection of the general DPSD model over the model where recollection is a linear
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function of familiarity should be taken with qualification. Similarly, the rejection of
the gamma model is qualified via DIC—it too may reflect DIC’s bias toward more
complex models in cases with large sample sizes. Ideally, more consistent model
selection techniques, such as Bayes factor or minimum description length (Grunwald,
Myung, & Pitt, 2005), would be available for this inference.
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Chapter 4
Selective Influence of Dual-Process
Parameters
In Chapter 3 the dual-process model was shown to provide a superior fit to recognition
memory data over competing signal detection models by DIC. This result implies that
DPSD outperforms selected competing models — it does not necessarily imply that
DPSD is a good model of recognition memory. A more desirable test is to examine
the performance of the DPSD model in its own right, rather than compare it with
other models that are also likely wrong in some ways. To do so, in this chapter I
explore whether the parameters of the DPSD model may be selectively influenced.
In a Selective influence test the research manipulates some variable. The to-be-
tested model makes predictions regarding which parameters should be affected by the
manipulation, and which should remain constant across levels of the manipulation.
If the parameters of the model are able to be selectively influenced, this result would
provide strong evidence in favor of the model. Alternatively, if all manipulations only
affect one parameter, or affect both parameters simultaneously, then the model is
mis-specified.
For the dual-process model, the critical question is whether some manipulations
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affect familiarity alone, whereas others affect only recollection. In Chapter 3 I showed
that the effects of people and items exist in both recollection and familiarity. More-
over, these effects are correlated. There has been a good deal of work that has
purportedly shown, however, that some manipulations are capable of influencing only
recollection or only familiarity. Here I review this work, and discuss several critical
flaws that render it questionable. Then, eight experiments are conducted and ana-
lyzed with the hierarchical DPSD model in an effort to obtain selective influence of
dual-process model parameters.
4.1 Previous Claims of Selective Influence
Yonelinas (2002) conducted a meta-analysis to explore whether parameters of the
dual-process model could be selectively influenced. His results are shown in Fig-
ure 4.1. The top panel shows the effects of encoding manipulations on familiarity and
recollection estimates. The bottom panel shows the same for retrieval manipulations.
Overall, these results imply that most manipulations affect both recollection and fa-
miliarity. When both parameters are affected, neither has been selectively influenced
and such demonstrations do not provide strong evidence for the model. There are,
however, some manipulations that may selectively influence recollection and famil-
iarity. First, the effect of slow verses fast response deadline appears to affect only
recollection. For slow deadline conditions participants take as much time as needed
to make a recognition judgment; in speeded conditions they are forced to respond
within a short (e.g., 1 second) time window after the test word is presented. This
finding fits well within the dual-process theory — recollection takes time to develop
whereas familiarity is automatic and develops quickly. When participants are forced
to respond quickly, there is no time for recollection to develop. On the other hand,
the effect of perceptual match vs. mismatch appears to be only in familiarity. An
91
example of a match-mismatch effect is when the fonts of items at test either match
or mismatch the fonts that the words were originally studied in. According to the
dual-process model, familiarity processes are based on perceptual characteristics being
reinstated at study, whereas recollection processes involve higher-order characteristics
such as semantic information. Thus, the match-mismatch effect in familiarity alone
and the response-deadline effect in recollection alone imply that parameters of the
dual-process model may be selectively influenced as predicted. There are, however,
several problems with the studies used in this meta-analysis. These problems are
considered in turn below.
4.1.1 Reliance on Averaged Data
All estimates in Figure 4.1 were obtained by averaging data over participants, items,
or both. There is no way to know the extent of how this averaging may have distorted
the results without knowledge of the true generating model and it’s parameters. One
resulting distortion that is likely, however, it that confidence intervals on parameter
estimates are biased to be too small, as shown in Chapter 2. When the test of a
model is to show an effect of a manipulation in one parameter, and a lack of effect in
another, it is critical that confidence intervals on parameters and the corresponding
significant tests are accurate. In this case, with confidence intervals that are too
small, it is likely that small effects of manipulations (see below for examples) had
no reliable effect on either recollection or familiarity. However, because of distorted
confidence intervals it is concluded that one (or both) parameters was affected. The
only solution to obtaining accurate estimates and confidence intervals is to account
for participant and item variability simultaneously as is done below.
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Figure 4.1: Meta-analysis results from Yonelinas (2002). The top panel shows the av-
erage effects on recollection and familiarity parameters for several encoding manipula-
tions. The bottom panel shows the same for retrieval manipulations. Parameter esti-
mates are averaged over confidence ratings, remember-know, and process-dissociation
procedure experiments.
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4.1.2 Reliance on Remember-Know Paradigm
The majority of studies used in the Yonelinas (2002) review utilize the remember-
know paradigm. In particular, the demonstration that perceptual match-mismatch
affects only familiarity comes from two remember-know studies by Gregg and Gar-
diner (1994). In a remember-know task, instead of confidence ratings participants are
given the response options “new”, “know”, and “remember”. They are instructed to
respond “remember” if they remember studying the word, and to respond “know”
if they know they studied the word but do not remember doing so. The proportion
of “know” responses to studied items is interpreted as a measure of familiarity, the
proportion of “remember” responses to studied items is interpreted as a measure of
recollection. In Gregg and Gardiner, the effect of perceptual match-mismatch was to
increase “know” responses, while leaving “remember” responses relatively unaffected.
Several critiques have been leveled against the remember-know paradigm (see
Dunn, 2004, for a review). Many of these critiques concern the fact that effects on
remember and know rates may reflect changes in response bias, rather than changes
in two separate mnemonic processes (such as recollection and familiarity). For ex-
ample, in the Gregg and Gardiner (1994) experiments, participants studied a list of
words presented visually on the screen. At test, half of the words were presented visu-
ally (perceptual match) and half were presented auditorially (perceptual mismatch).
The resulting remember and know rates are shown in Table 4.1. “Remember” re-
sponses to studied items were low, but relatively stable across the mismatch and
match conditions; “know” responses to studied items doubled across mismatch and
match conditions. Critically, however, “know” responses to new items also doubled
across conditions. This effect is not surprising, as the match and mismatch conditions
are confounded with visual and auditory presentation at test. It seems that when par-
ticipants are presented with an auditory item they are more likely to respond that
they studied it (“know” responses) regardless of whether it was actually studied or
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Table 4.1: Results From Gregg & Gardiner
Remember Know
Auditory Visual Auditory Visual
Studied .10 .11 .27 .52
New .05 .03 .09 .18
not. In this experiment, such a response-bias effect provides a perfectly viable ex-
planation of the results without any recourse to recollection and familiarity. In fact,
Dunn (2004) was able to fit these data and data from 400 other conditions extremely
well with an equal-variance signal detection model designed for remember-know data.
4.1.3 Lack of Selective Influence in Confidence Ratings
Unlike remember-know, in the confidence-rating paradigm mnemonic processes such
as recollection and familiarity, assuming they exist, are capable of being assessed in-
dependently of response biases. The question is, then, whether there exist convincing
selective influence results in any ROC studies. One of the most impressive claims of
selective influence in ROC curves comes from Yonelinas et al. (2002), who admin-
istered a confidence-rating task to normal participants, and to patients with medial
temporal-lobe damage. Because the medial temporal lobe, including the hippocam-
pus, is thought to underlie the recollection process, Yonelinas et al. hypothesized that
only recollection estimates from DPSD should differ across controls and patients. The
resulting ROC data are shown in Figure 4.2A. Fits of the dual-process model to these
data imply a small effect of this brain damage on familiarity (.36 to .29), and a
pronounced effect on recollection (.35 to .08).
The ROC curves for controls and brain-damaged patients differ in an important
way that does not necessarily have anything to do with recollection or familiarity:
Performance patients is worse than that for controls. As overall performance gets
worse, the ROC curve approaches the diagonal. Accordingly, the small change in “fa-
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Figure 4.2: A. ROC curves from controls (highest curve) and two groups of brain-
damaged patients (lower two curves) in Yonelinas et al. (2002). Lines are predictions
from the best-fitting gamma signal detection model presented in Chapter 3. B. ROC
curves from all confidence-rating studies reviewed by Yonelinas (2002). C. Estimates
of recollection from the ROC curves in B as a function of estimates of familiarity. Lines
connect two conditions within a study. Colors represent different manipulations.
miliarity” accompanied by a large change in “recollection” may simply be an artifact
of the ROC curve becoming more symmetric as overall performance worsens. The re-
lationship between overall performance and asymmetry does not imply a two-process
model. In fact, the lines in Figure 4.2A are from the single-process gamma signal
detection model (see Chapter 3), in which ROC asymmetry and overall performance
naturally co-vary. As can be seen, this single-process model provides a very good
account of the ROC data. The result is that these data provide evidence of selective
influence evidence in the dual-process model, only if perfectly viable single-process
accounts of the data are ignored.
Figure 4.2B shows the ROC curves used in the meta-analysis performed by Yoneli-
nas (2002). Strong evidence for the dual-process model would manifest as, for exam-
ple, some straight lines (low familiarity) crossing over the curved ones. There is noise
in these curves, however, overall they do not cross, but rather, exhibit the degree of
curvature and asymmetry predicted by the gamma model: more asymmetry as overall
performance increases. Figure 4.2C shows estimates of recollection as a function of
estimates of familiarity from the ROC curves in Figure 4.2B. Although these data
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were used as evidence for selective influence, it is clear that every manipulation con-
sidered in the review affected both recollection and familiarity to some extent. Thus,
neither parameter was capable of being manipulated independently.
The plot of recollection as a function of familiarity in Figure 4.2C provides a con-
venient way of assessing selective influence, and more generally whether two processes
are necessary to account for the data. Recall that if recollection and familiarity al-
ways co-vary, then this redundancy implies a single process. If this is the case, then
the two-dimensional recollection-familiarity space should be able to be reduced to a
single dimension by drawing a monotonically increasing line through all of the data
points (taking noise into account). If such a line cannot account for the data, then
this failure to reduce the space to one dimension implies that two processes are nec-
essary. This analysis is similar to state-trace analysis (Bamber, 1979), but relies on
plotting parameters rather than data.
The data in Figure 4.2C all lie roughly on a common trajectory that is similar to
the diagonal. Without confidence intervals on the estimates, however, it is impossible
to test whether violations of this uni-dimensional trajectory exist. Moreover, had con-
fidence intervals been available they would have been obtained from averaged data,
and thus, underestimated. A main goal of this chapter is to determine whether accu-
rately estimated estimates of recollection and familiarity all lie on a single trajectory
in this space, or if violations can be found implying a two-process model.
4.1.4 Small Effects
In order to provide a convincing demonstration of selective influence, it is necessary
that the overall effect of a manipulation be substantial. If it is not, then a failure to
find effects in one parameter may simply be due to a lack of power resulting from a
small overall effect to begin with. One example is the match-mismatch effect in Fig-
ure 4.1. Although these results suggest that the effect of perceptual match-mismatch
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is only in familiarity, the overall effect size is small compared to that for other ma-
nipulations. It is therefore possible that, had a sizable effect been found, estimates
of recollection would also be affected. In fact, the mere existence of the perceptual
match-mismatch effect has been debated (Mulligan, Besken, & Peterson, 2010; Mulli-
gan & Hirshman, 1995), and no study has been conducted with large match-mismatch
effects, much less large effects that affect only familiarity. In subsequent experiments
I attempt to obtain a large match-mismatch effect in order to test whether such effects
manifest in recollection as the overall effect increases.
The small match-mismatch effect is an example of a more general failure of re-
searchers to acknowledge that small effects are not useful for showing selective influ-
ence. For example, in a recent study Howard, Bessette-Symons, Zhang, and Hoyer
(2006) claim to have provided evidence from ROC curves that aging selectively im-
pairs recollection, leaving familiarity relatively intact. ROC curves for their old and
young participants are shown in Figure 4.3. From the ROC curves it is obvious
that Howard et al. found little to no effect of aging on overall performance. I have
taken the data from this study and converted the confidence ratings into simple bi-
nomial hit rates (any “studied” response to studied items) and false alarm rates (any
“new” response to studied items). These rates were converted to d′ values for each
participant by the standard EVSD definition (Φ−1(hit) − Φ−1(fa)). These binomial
d′ values provide a very simple measure of overall recognition performance for each
participant. A t-test on these d′ values reveals that Howard et al. found no effect
of young vs. old adults on recognition memory performance by this crude binomial
measure (dyoung = .9793, dold = .9790, t(75) = .003, p ≈ 1). Nonetheless, in fitting the
DPSD model and comparing estimates across the old and young groups, familiarity
estimates were larger for the old than the young participants, but this difference was
not significant (t(69.4) = 1.41, p < .15). The effect in recollection was in the op-
posite direction (young higher than old), and this effect was significant by a t-test
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(t(72.9) = 2.22, p < .03).
There are several reasons why the data from Howard et al. should not be taken
as evidence of selective influence. One problem with this analysis is simply that the
overall effect is so small that, if older adults were slightly impaired in familiarity
there would be no chance of measuring such an effect in this study. Another problem
concerns their conclusion that there is an effect on recollection. For one, because
familiarity estimates were actually lower for young than old, the reverse pattern in
recollection may simply reflect a trade-off between recollection and familiarity esti-
mates when the model is applied to two conditions that do not differ at all. Such
a trade-off between recollection and familiarity estimates is common, as the joint
likelihood function contains a very shallow ridge. Moreover, because the confidence
in these estimates are biased due to averaging over items, any marginally significant
effect must be interpreted with caution. Even in the absence of biased confidence
intervals, it is well-known that null hypothesis tests are biased to reject the null hy-
pothesis (Edwards, Lindman, & Savage, 1963; Goodman, 1999; Jeffreys, 1961; Sellke,
Bayarri, & Berger, 2001; E.-J. Wagenmakers & Grunwald, 2006). A more balanced
assessment may be made using a Bayes Factor test (see Rouder, Speckman, Sun,
Morey, & Iverson, 2009). This test reveals that for these data, the alternative hy-
pothesis that recollection is different across old and young is only 1.6 times more
likely than the null hypothesis that they are the same 1. Such a small Bayes Factor
is considered marginal to zero evidence for a difference. The confluence of problems
with the interpretation of Howard el al. are likely common. Unfortunately, such
studies are often treated as strong evidence for the dual-process theory. The result is
a collection of studies that looks like an impressive foundation for dual-process (e.g.,
1The Bayes Factor was derived from the reported t-value, which was obtained by assuming
unequal variances in mean recollection across old and young. The t-test derived by Rouder et al.
(2009) assumes equal variances. If Howard et al. had run a t-test assuming equal-variances, the
t-value may have been somewhat larger. The difference is likely small, however, as the true degrees
of freedom (77) and the corrected degrees of freedom reported (72.9) were similar.
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Figure 4.3: ROC curves from young and old participants in Howard et al. (2006).
Estimates of recollection and familiarity are those derived by Howard et al.
Figure 4.1). This foundation, however, falls apart when a closer look is taken at the
piecewise evidence.
The goal of Experiments 3-6 is to determine whether parameters of the dual-
process model can be selectively influenced. Manipulations of levels-of-processing,
perceptual match-mismatch, and response deadline are considered. Before assessing
selective influence of recollection and familiarity, however, I explore whether the crite-
ria parameters in the dual-process model may be selectively influenced by a response
bias manipulation. According to the model, changes in response biases for certain
confidence-rating responses over others should effect the criteria, but not effect either
recollection or familiarity estimates. If response bias manipulations can effect famil-
iarity or recollection, then clearly these parameters are not measuring what they are
intended to.
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4.2 Experiment 2: Biasing Confidence Ratings
In the Yonelinas dual-process model, the probability of recollection is greatly deter-
mined by the probability of responding “sure studied”. It is therefore important that
changes in the probability of making this response that are not due to recollection
differences do not effect the estimate of recollection. In Experiment 2 the probabilities
of making particular confidence rating responses (e.g., “sure studied”) were manipu-
lated across conditions by using payoffs to bias participants toward certain responses
over others. In the dual-process model the effect of this bias manipulation should
manifest in criteria. The bias manipulation should not, however, have any effect on
recollection or familiarity.
4.2.1 Methods
Participants
Twenty-two University of Missouri students participated in Experiment 2 in return
for credit toward a course requirement.
Stimuli
Stimuli were the same 480 words used in Experiment 1.
Procedure
Participants began with a practice session in which they studied five items. Following
study they preformed a practice test session. At test the screen displayed a running
tally of how many points the participant had earned thus far (starting at 0), and a
figure informing the participant of how many points each response would earn or lose,
depending on whether the response was correct or incorrect, respectively. Figure 4.4A
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Figure 4.4: Experiment 2 biasing conditions. Either panel A or panel B were displayed
to participants throughout Experiment 2. Bars above zero indicate points gained if
the new/studied response is correct, and those below zero indicate points lost if the
new/studied response is incorrect. A. Point structure should bias participants to use
the outside (“sure”) responses. B. Point structure should bias participants to use the
inside (“believe”) responses.
shows the figure displayed at practice. Following a button press, a test word appeared
and participants made one of the four available response options: “sure new”, “believe
new”, “believe studied”, and “sure studied”. Following response, the point tally was
updated, and participants were instructed to press a button to see the next word.
Four response options were used instead of six because a pilot experiment suggested
that participants were not able to successfully use the more complex 6-button point
structures to bias responses.
Following practice participants completed the study phase by reading each of 240
randomly-selected items aloud. Following study, participants were instructed to care-
fully examine the point-structure graphic shown in Figure 4.4A in order to maximize
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points. This point structure is termed biased out as it should bias participants to use
the outer (“sure”) responses. This point structure was kept on the screen for the first
120 test trials. After the 120th trial, a screen appeared to warn participants that the
point structure was changing, and that they should examine the new graphic carefully.
For the next 240 trials the point-structure graphic in Figure 4.4B was displayed on
the screen. This point structure is termed biased in as it should bias participants to
use the inside (“believe”) buttons. Following these trials, the point structure changed
back to that in Figure 4.4A for the remaining 120 trials. This ABBA design for bias
conditions was employed for all participants.
4.2.2 Results
ROC curves for the biased-in and biased-out conditions, averaged over participants
and items, are shown in Figure 4.5A. Even though these ROC curves are distorted
due to averaging, they suggest that the bias manipulation was remarkably confined to
moving hits and false alarms along a common trajectory. That is, the bias manipula-
tion had no effect on the shape or position of the ROC curve, but had a substantial
effect on where the data points lie upon it.
The hierarchical DPSD model was fit to data from the biased-out and biased-in
conditions separately. In Figure 4.5B estimates of criteria from the biased-in condition
are plotted as a function of those from the biased-out condition for each participant.
In the biased-out condition criteria were close to zero, reflecting a high probability
of using the outside “sure” responses. Criteria in the biased-in condition are further
from zero, reflecting a higher probability of using the inside “believe” responses.
Figure 4.5C shows estimates of grand means of recollection and familiarity for each
bias condition. Clearly, neither recollection nor familiarity estimates differ across the
biased-out and biased-in conditions.
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Figure 4.5: Results from Experiment 2. A. ROC curves for the biased-in and biased-
out conditions, constructed by averaging over participant and items. B. Estimates
of DPSD criteria for the biased-in condition as a function of those for the biased-
out condition for each participant. Points labeled “1” are the criteria separating the
“sure new” and “believe new” responses; points labeled “2” are criteria separating
the “believe studied” and “sure studied” responses. C. Estimates of the grand means
of recollection and familiarity (d(s)−d(n)) for the biased-in and biased-out conditions.
Error bars are 95% credible intervals.
4.2.3 Discussion
Using payoffs to manipulate response biases for certain confidence ratings over others
appears to move points along a common ROC curve. Moreover, the payoff manipula-
tion selectively influenced the criteria parameters in the DPSD model. Beyond being
an example of selective influence in DPSD, these results provide novel evidence that
confidence ratings are tapping the same response biases as other means of drawing
ROC curves (e.g., differential payoffs).
Experiment 2 provides evidence that criteria may be selectively influence in DPSD.
The goal of Experiments 3, 4, 5, & 6 is to determine whether recollection and famil-
iarity parameters may also be selectively influenced, as claimed by Yonelinas (2002).
If instead changes in recollection are always accompanied by changes in familiarity,
this redundancy would suggest that a single-parameter model (e.g., non-normal signal
detection) is sufficient to describe the data.
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4.3 Experiment 3: LOP & Match-Mismatch
According to the dual-process model, a levels-of-processing (LOP) manipulation (Craik
& Lockhart, 1972) at study should affect only recollection. Alternatively, a percep-
tual match-mismatch manipulation should affect only familiarity. These predictions
were tested in Experiment 3 by varying both LOP and perceptual match-mismatch
conditions within subjects and fitting the hierarchical DPSD model.
4.3.1 Methods
Participants
Fifty-two University of Missouri students participated in Experiment 3 in return for
credit toward a course requirement.
Stimuli
Stimuli were the same 480 words used in Experiment 1.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1 with the following exceptions. At study,
each word was accompanied by one of two sets of instructions. For half of the words,
the instructions read “Read the word out loud and enter the number of vowels”.
For these shallow study instructions, participants used the numeric keyboard keys to
enter in the number of vowels in the word on the screen. For the remaining words, the
instructions read “Read the word out loud and enter a related word”. For these deep
study instructions, participants were instructed to enter in the first word that came
to mind which was related to the word on the screen. Instructions varied randomly
from trial to trial. Each study word was either displayed in lowercase letters and red
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ink, or in uppercase letters in green ink. Following study, the test phase consisted of
240 new words and the 240 previously-studied words. The color/case of half of the
studied words was the same as when the word was studied, and the color/case of the
remaining half was different (e.g., study in lowercase-red, tested in uppercase-green).
This match vs. mismatch condition was counterbalanced with LOP condition.
4.3.2 Results
ROC curves for each condition (averaged over participants and items) are shown in
Figure 4.6A. A crude measure of accuracy may be constructed by calculating hits as
any “studied” response to studied items, and false alarms as any “studied” response
to new items. The difference of the inverse probit transforms of these rates (averaged
over items) provides a crude estimate of d′ (from EVSD). Doing so reveals that overall
accuracy for two participants was near chance (d′ < .1), and so their data were not
considered in analysis. The average d′ values for the remaining 50 participants were
subjected to a 2x2 mixed-effects ANOVA with LOP condition and match-mismatch
condition serving as factors. Although the effect of match-mismatch was small, the
ANOVA revealed main effects of both match-mismatch (F (1, 49) = 9.7, p < .05) and
LOP (F (1, 49) = 405, p < .05), but no interaction between the two (F (1, 49) = 0.74).
The hierarchical dual-process model was fit to the data with the R package HBMEM.
Figure 4.6B shows estimates of recollection for each of the four conditions as a function
of estimates of familiarity d′. The large effect of LOP is primarily in recollection,
as predicted by the dual-process model. Familiarity estimates for the shallow and
deep LOP conditions are near 1.0, and so the lack of any substantial effect of LOP
on familiarity does not reflect a floor or ceiling effect. Unfortunately, the match-
mismatch effect was very small, as can be seen in the ROC curves (Figure 4.6A).
In the DPSD model fit, this small effect manifests only in familiarity, as predicted.
However, because the effect is so small it is possible that a lack of any match-mismatch
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Figure 4.6: Results from Experiment 3. A. ROC curves for each condition. B.
Estimates of recollection for each condition plotted as a function of estimates of
familiarity (d
(s)
k − d(n)k ) for each condition.
effect in recollection is merely a symptom of having a small effect to begin with. In
Experiments 4-6, I attempt to increase the size of the match-mismatch effect in order
to determine whether it really does provide evidence of selective influence.
The same items were used in Experiments 1 and 3. If parameters of the hierarchi-
cal DPSD model are measuring meaningful aspects of the data, then item-effect esti-
mates should be similar across these experiments, even though they employ different
participants and different study conditions (recall that in Experiment 1 participants
simply read each word aloud). In Figure 4.7, item effect estimates from Experiment 3
are plotted as a function of those from Experiment 1. Clearly, there is a relationship
between these estimates for new-item familiarity, studied-item familiarity, and to a
lesser extent, recollection. This comparison does not provide strong support for the
DPSD model — if another model such as gamma signal-detection was generating the
data, we would nevertheless expect DPSD parameters to be similar across experi-
ments. Figure 4.7 does, however, bolster our claim that item variability is systematic
and consistent, and therefore, ought to be accounted for in any ROC analysis.
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Figure 4.7: DPSD item effects from Experiment 3 plotted as a function of those
from Experiment 1. A. Item effects on new-item familiarity d
(n)
j . B. Item effects on
studied-item familiarity d
(s)
j . C. Item effects on recollection Rj.
The left panels of Figure 4.8 show recollection effects for participants (top) and
items (bottom) as a function of sensitivity d′. As in Experiment 1, recollection is
positively correlated with sensitivity for both participants and items. The middle
and right panels show the relationship between recollection and new-item familiarity,
and recollection and studied-item familiarity, respectively. Again, as in Experiment 1,
the relationship between recollection and familiarity is primarily driven by a negative
correlation between recollection and baseline familiarity for both participants and
items. As discussed in Chapter 3, this relationship may reflect structure underlying
the two memory processes. Alternatively, it may reflect the fact that a single process
is generating these data, and fitting an overly complex model manifests as correlations
among parameters.
In addition to fitting the DPSD model, the gamma, UVSD, and extended UVSD
signal detection models were fit to the data from Experiment 3. The dual-process
model outperformed UVSD with one value of σ2 by 534 DIC points, the gamma
model by 497 points, and the extended UVSD model with free σ2 across people and
items by 465 DIC points. These patterns in DIC fit are nearly identical to those
in Experiment 1; the magnitudes of the DPSD advantage is smaller simply because
there are fewer participants.
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Figure 4.8: The relationship between recollection and familiarity estimates from Ex-
periment 3 for participant effects (top) and item effects (bottom). The left panels
show recollection as a function of sensitivity d′ defined as d(s) − d(n). The middle
panels show recollection as a function of new-item, baseline familiarity d(n), the right
panels show recollection as a function of studied-item familiarity d(s).
4.3.3 Discussion
The results of Experiment 3 show that the levels-of-processing effect is primarily in
the recollection parameter, as predicted by the dual-process model. There is also,
however, a small LOP effect in familiarity, possibly indicating a 1-process model that
manifests as large effects in recollection accompanied by small effects in familiarity (in
this range of the space). Unfortunately, the match-mismatch effect was too small to
be useful in assessing selective influence. For example, it clear that in Figure 4.6B a
line can be drawn through the recollection-familiarity space that accounts for all four
conditions in Experiment 3. It is not clear, however, whether this uni-dimensional
structure could be violated had a larger match-mismatch effect been observed. The
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goal of Experiments 4a-c is to increase the magnitude of the match-mismatch effect
so that selective influence may be better assessed.
4.4 Experiments 4a-c: Increasing the Match-Mismatch
Effect
In the Yonelinas (2002) review, the match-mismatch effect provides the most com-
pelling evidence of a manipulation that affects familiarity without affecting recollec-
tion (see Figure 4.1). A closer look at the data used in this meta-analysis reveals
that 1) all of the studies utilized the remember-know procedure, and 2) three of the
four studies came from Gregg and Gardiner (1994). Moreover, in the fourth study,
preformed by Rajaram (1993), there was exactly zero effect of match-mismatch. In
Experiments 4a - c, I attempt to more closely replicate the work of Gregg and Gar-
diner (1994) in an effort to increase the match-mismatch effect. In Experiment 4a,
all words were studied visually on the computer screen (as in previous experiments).
At test, however, some words were presented visually as they were during study, and
some were presented auditorily over headphones. Studied words are in the perceptual
match condition when they are tested visually, and are in the mismatch condition
when tested auditorily. Our hope is that this modality (visual vs. auditory system)
match-mismatch manipulation will produce larger effects than the case-color manip-
ulation used in Experiment 3.
4.4.1 Experiment 4a: Modality Match-Mismatch
Methods
Twenty-six University of Missouri students participated in Experiment 4a in return
for credit toward a course requirement. Stimuli were the same 480 words used in
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Experiment 1. In addition to the visual stimuli, each word was recorded being read
by a male voice as a 2-second audio file. At study, participants viewed words visually
and performed one of the two LOP instructions used in Experiment 3 (count vowels
vs. generate related word); participants were not instructed to read each word aloud.
All of the words were presented in white on a black background. At study, half of
the words were presented on the computer screen, and participants made one of six
confidence ratings. The remaining half of words were presented auditorily over a pair
of headphones. One second prior to, and during auditory presentation, the screen
read “Audio Presentation” accompanied by a picture of headphones. Following the
2-second auditory presentation, “Respond To Audio Presentation” appeared on the
screen, at which point participants made a confidence rating.
Results
Data for two participants were discarded due to a computer error. ROC curves, con-
structed by averaging data over participants and items, are shown in Figure 4.9A.
A crude measure of d′ was calculated as it was in Experiment 3. A within-subjects
ANOVA on d′ with LOP and match-mismatch conditions as factors revealed a main
effect of LOP condition (F (1, 23) = 358.60, p < .05), a marginally significant main
effect of match-mismatch condition (F (1, 23) = 4.14, p = .054), and no interaction
(F (1, 23) = 2.83, p = .11). Values of d′ for the match and mismatch conditions
(averaged over LOP condition) were 2.02 and 1.87, respectively. The goal of Experi-
ment 4a was to increase the size of the match-mismatch effect compared with that of
Experiment 3, but as the ANOVA and ROC curves in Figure 4.9A shows, this goal
was clearly not met. Thus, no further analyses were conducted.
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Figure 4.9: ROC curves from Experiments 4a-c. A. ROC curves from Experiment 4a.
B. ROC curves from Experiment 4b. C. ROC curves from Experiment 4c.
4.4.2 Experiment 4b: Fast Study Presentation
Experiment 4a was an attempt to make Experiment 3 more like the work of Gregg &
Gardiner’s first experiment, in which they claimed to have found an effect of modality
match-mismatch. However, the effect was also small in their first experiment, and
they increased the effect in their second experiment by making the study task a
“highly perceptual orienting task”. At study, words were presented on the screen
for 200ms, and participants were asked to simply count how many of these words
appeared blurry (none of the words were actually blurry). The goal was to make
participant’s encoding of the words highly perceptual, thus increasing the modality
match-mismatch effect. We followed Gregg & Gardner in our Experiment 4b, in
another attempt to increase the modality match-mismatch effect.
Methods
Six University of Missouri students participated in Experiment 4b in return for credit
toward a course requirement. We had intended to run 25 participants, but the data
from these six made it clear that the match-mismatch effect was no larger than in
Experiment 4a. Stimuli were the same 480 words used in Experiment 1. At study,
participants were shown 280 words for 200 ms each, with a 300 ms blank period
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between words. They were instructed to simply look at each word, and press the
space bar during presentation of the word if they were unable to read it. Following
study, participants were briefed that their memory would now be tested for the words
that were presented. The test procedure was identical to that of Experiment 4a (half
of the words presented visually, half presented auditorily). Note that participants
were not briefed about the test phase until after study, making this an incidental
learning task.
Results
ROC curves, constructed by averaging data over participants and items, are shown in
Figure 4.9B. Crude estimates of d′ were computed for each participant as they were
in Experiment 4a. The difference in performance between the match (d′ = .42) and
mismatch (d′ = .44) conditions was not significant (t(5) = .50, p = .64). Although the
sample size is small, a Bayes factor t-test (see Rouder et al., 2009) on these d′ values
reveals that they are 2.9 times more likely to come from the same distribution than
different ones. Clearly, there was no modality match-mismatch effect, even though
the study task was designed to be highly perceptual. This lack of effect, however,
may be due to the overall poor performance in this task. If performance is near floor
for both conditions, then there would be no opportunity for an effect to arise even if
one exists.
4.4.3 Experiment 4c: Shorter Study-Test Lists
Experiments 4a and 4b differed from those of Gregg & Gardiner in that our study lists
contained 240 items with 480 items at test; they used 40 and 80 item study and test
lists, respectively, across several study-test sessions. It is possible that longer test lists
force participants to rely on semantic memory rather than perceptual, negating any
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modality match-mismatch effect. Moreover, the longer study and test lists explain
the poor accuracy obtained in Experiment 4b. Experiment 4c was the same as 4b,
except that participants performed several smaller study-tests sessions, rather than
one big session.
Methods
Sixteen University of Missouri students participated in Experiment 4c in return for
credit toward a course requirement. The experiment was identical to Experiment 4b
with the following exception. Participants studied 40 words, and where then tested
on 80. They completed this study-test cycle 6 times.
Results
ROC curves are shown in Figure 4.9C. Average performance for the match (d′ = 1.13)
and mismatch (d′ = 1.02) conditions was higher than in Experiment 4b, however, they
did not differ significantly (t(15) = 1.76, p = .10). Again, although there is a small
modality match-mismatch effect, it is much to small to be of use for assessing selective
influence.
4.4.4 Discussion
The meta-analysis of Yonelinas (2002) implies that perceptual match-mismatch ma-
nipulations affect familiarity without affecting recollection. Such an effect would
provide especially good evidence for the dual-process model, as finding an effect in
familiarity alone is rare or even non-existent (see Rouder, Lu, et al., 2008). Un-
fortunately, a closer look this meta-analysis reveals that all of the experiments that
actually showed an effect at all were from Gregg and Gardiner (1994), who used the
remember-know paradigm. The goal of Experiments 4a-c was to replicate Gregg &
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Gardiner in the confidence rating paradigm. Unfortunately, across three experiments,
either no effect of modality match-mismatch was found, or the effect was much too
small for making reliable inferences about selective influence.
In a more recent study, Boldini, Russo, and Avons (2004) examined the modal-
ity match-mismatch effect under conditions of speeded and un-speeded responses in
an old-new recognition memory task. When participants were allowed ample time
to make old-new judgments, Boldini et al. found no effect of match-mismatch, as
in Experiments 4a-c above. However, when participants were forced to make old-
new judgments within a short time window (less than 700 ms), the modality match-
mismatch effect was as large as .5 d′ units. Because recollection takes time to develop,
theoretically, forcing participants to respond quickly eliminates any contribution of
recollection to recognition judgments. Because participants must rely solely on fa-
miliarity to perform the task, manipulations that affect familiarity (such as modality
match-mismatch) become apparent.
In Experiment 5 I attempt to replicate the speeded conditions of Boldini et al., in
which a match-mismatch effect was found, in the confidence-rating paradigm. This
experiment provides three important tests of the dual-process model. First, the effect
of speeding responses should be in recollection and not familiarity. This prediction
will be assessed by comparing the results of Experiment 5 with those from Experi-
ment 3, in which responses were not speeded. The second prediction is that, because
recollection has been reduced or eliminated, there should be no effect of LOP in the
speeded conditions, as LOP effects should be mediated by recollection alone. Finally,
Experiment 5 should serve as a replication of Boldini et al., but with confidence
ratings rather than simple old-new recognition. Specifically, there should be a match-
mismatch effect even though none was found in Experiment 3 or Experiments 4a-c.
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4.5 Experiment 5: Response Deadline; Long Study
List
Experiment 5 was identical to Experiment 3 in that there was both an LOP manipu-
lation and a perceptual match-mismatch manipulation. It differed from Experiment 3
in that participants were required to make confidence-rating responses within a short
window following presentation of each test word.
4.5.1 Methods
Participants
Fifty-three University of Missouri students participated in Experiment 5 in return for
credit toward a course requirement.
Stimuli
Stimuli were the same 480 words used in Experiment 3, presented visually throughout
the experiment.
Procedure
The study session in Experiment 5 was identical to that used in Experiment 3. Par-
ticipants either counted the number of vowels in each study word (shallow LOP
condition), or generated a word that was related to each study word (deep LOP
condition). Each study word was also presented in lowercase-red, or uppercase-blue.
At test, half of the studied words were presented in the same case/color as at study
(perceptual match) or the opposite case/color (perceptual mismatch). Each test trial
began with a fixation cross. Following 500 ms of fixation, a test word appeared. After
500 ms, “****” was presented below the test word. Participants were instructed to
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respond as soon as possible, after the “****” appeared. If the response was made
before the “****” appeared, a low-pitched error tone (buzz) sounded, followed by the
message “Too Fast, Respond after ****”, presented for 3 seconds. If the response
was made more than 500 ms after the “****” appeared, the same low-pitched error
tone sounded, followed by the message “Too Slow, Response Faster!!!”, also presented
for 3 seconds. Thus, participants had to respond within a window from 500-1000 ms
after the test word was presented. For comparison, in Experiment 3 the average re-
sponse time was 1.97 seconds, and the 25th percentile was 1.05 seconds. Thus, the
500-1000ms window should allow ample time to make a confidence rating response,
but not allow for much deliberate reflection upon whether a word had been studied
or not.
Prior to the study phase, participants completed two training phases to get them
acquainted with the response window and test instructions. First, participants were
given test trials with “WORD” serving as the stimulus. They were instructed to
make any of the 6 confidence ratings as quickly as possible after the “****” appeared.
They had to make their response within the correct response window 15 times in a
row before moving on (most participants had no problem doing so after making a few
“too slow” errors). Next they completed a practice study-test phase with a 10-item
test list, before moving on to the study phase.
4.5.2 Results
Responses that were made outside of the response window (13%) were discarded. A
crude measure of accuracy was constructed as for previous experiments. Doing so
reveals that overall accuracy for five participants was near or below chance (d′ < .01)
indicating a failure to follow instructions, and so their data were not considered in
analysis. ROC curves for each condition (averaged over participants and items) are
shown in Figure 4.10A. The crude d′ values for each participant were subject to a 2x2
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Figure 4.10: Results from Experiment 5. A. ROC curves for each condition. B.
Estimates of recollection for each condition plotted as a function of estimates of
familiarity (d
(s)
k − d(n)k ) for each condition.
mixed-effects ANOVA with LOP condition and match-mismatch condition serving as
factors. As in Experiment 3, although the effect of match-mismatch was small, the
ANOVA revealed main effects of both match-mismatch (F (1, 47) = 5.69, p < .05) and
LOP (F (1, 47) = 109.96, p < .05), but no interaction between the two (F (1, 47) = 0).
To determine the effect of response speeding on the match-mismatch effect, the
match-mismatch effects (as measured with the binomial d’ value) may be compared
across the un-speeded (Experiment 3) and speeded (Experiment 5) conditions. Com-
paring the mean match-mismatch effect for participants in Experiment 3 (.10) with
those from Experiment 5 (.06) reveals that there is no significant difference between
them (t(96) = 1.02,p = .31).
The hierarchical dual-process model was fit to the data with the R package HBMEM.
Figure 4.10B shows estimates of recollection for each of the four conditions as a func-
tion of estimates of familiarity d′. Because according to the dual-process model speed-
ing should affect mostly recollection, and the LOP effect should be in recollection,
there should be no effect of LOP in the speeded conditions. Figure 4.10 shows that
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there is some effect of LOP, however, the magnitude of this effect is greatly attenuated
when compared with the un-speeded conditions of Experiment 3. The remaining ef-
fect of LOP appears to be in both recollection and familiarity, however, it is not clear
that either of these differences are significant. The small match-mismatch effect again
appears to manifest only in familiarity, as predicted by the dual-process model. As in
Experiment 3, however, this effect is too small to make reliable claims about selective
influence. It is, however, interesting that in four of the four conditions tested, the
small match-mismatch effect is seen only in familiarity.
Figure 4.11 shows estimates of recollection as a function of familiarity for Exper-
iments 1, 3 (un-speeded), and 5 (speeded) collapsed over match-mismatch condition.
Whereas the dual-process model predicts that the effect of speeding should be pri-
marily in recollection, speeding seems to affect both recollection and familiarity. It is,
however, possible that the response window was so short as to not only degrade the
recollection process, but perhaps also did not allow participants enough time to make
responses based on familiarity. The critical question is whether all of the explored
effects (LOP, match-mismatch, and response speeding) manifest in both recollection
and familiarity, such that a line may be drawn through the 2-dimensional space re-
ducing it to one dimension. If so, then this reduction is evidence that the dual-process
model is over-specified. Across these three experiments, a monotonically-increasing
line may be drawn that encompasses each of the nine conditions. One such line is
shown in Figure 4.11. Although this simple line is not completely encompassed by
all credible intervals, it is close, and a more complex line exists that could do so and
yet retain monotonicity.
4.5.3 Discussion
The results of Experiments 1, 3, and 5 do not provide evidence in favor of the dual-
process model. The effects of the LOP manipulation, and speeded vs. un-speeded
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Figure 4.11: DPSD estimates from Experiments 1, 3, and 5. Estimates of recollection
for each condition are plotted as a function of estimates of familiarity, averaged across
match-mismatch conditions. The line is the function R(d) = .2 ∗ d4 + .05, which was
simply fit by hand.
response deadline conditions were both large. Both effects, however, were present in
both recollection and familiarity. The result is that recollection and familiarity pa-
rameter estimates trace out a 1-dimensional curve in Figure 4.11 that is characteristic
of a single-process model.
The line in Figure 4.11 implies a single-process model. It is possible, however,
that conditions exist with parameters that lie off the common 1-dimensional line, but
I have simply not found them yet. Experiment 6 is an effort to find such a condition.
Looking at Figure 4.11 it is clear that the existence of any condition that has low
familiarity but high recollection would violate the current 1-dimensional nature of
the space. In ROC space, such a condition would be a nearly straight line that lies
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substantially off of the diagonal. Although to my knowledge such data have only been
observed in a working memory task (Rouder, Morey, et al., 2008), one plausible way
to achieve such a condition is to increase the amount of recollection in Experiment 5
without affecting familiarity. Although not shown in the Yonelinas (2002) review, one
purported way to selectively affect recollection is to vary the length of the study (and
test) list (Yonelinas, 1994). Increasing the number of studied items increases inter-
item interference. According to the dual-process model, such interference should only
affect recollective processes, as familiarity is automatic and operates independently of
other storage processes (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1994). In Experiment 6, Experiment 5
is replicated but with a shorter study list. The dual-process model predicts that
this effect should be solely in recollection. If such selective influence in achieved,
then these conditions will lie in the upper-left part of Figure 4.11, thus violating the
uni-dimensionality of the space.
4.6 Experiment 6: Response Deadline; Short Study
List
The goal of Experiment 6 is to replicate Experiment 5, but with a shorter study list.
According to the dual-process model, study list length should affect only recollec-
tion. If this predicted selective influence holds, then the recollection and familiarity
estimates will lie outside of the 1-dimensional line in Figure 4.11.
4.6.1 Methods
Participants
Sixty-four University of Missouri students participated in Experiment 6 in return for
credit toward a course requirement.
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Stimuli
Stimuli were 160 words randomly selected from the 480-word pool used in previous
experiments.
Procedure
Experiment 6 was identical to Experiment 5 with the exception that each participant
studied 80 words (selected randomly) and was tested on 160. The study and test
lengths were therefore one third the length of those used in Experiment 5.
4.6.2 Results
Responses that were made outside of the response window (15%) were discarded.
A crude measure of accuracy was constructed as for previous experiments. Doing so
reveals that overall accuracy for eight participants was near or below chance (d′ < .01)
indicating a failure to follow instructions, and so their data were not considered in
analysis. ROC curves for each condition (averaged over participants and items) are
shown in Figure 4.12A. The d′ values for each participant were subject to a 2x2
mixed-effects ANOVA with LOP condition and match-mismatch condition serving
as factors. As in Experiments 3 & 5, although the effect of match-mismatch was
small, the ANOVA revealed main effects of both match-mismatch (F (1, 55) = 5.23,
p < .05) and LOP (F (1, 55) = 113.3, p < .05), but no interaction between the two
(F (1, 55) = .52, p = .47).
Figure 4.12B shows estimates of recollection for each of the four conditions in
Experiment 6 as a function of estimates of familiarity d′. Like Experiment 5, the
effect of LOP appears to be in both recollection and familiarity. Unlike previous
experiments, the match-mismatch effect also now appears in both recollection and
familiarity. This effect, however, is still too small to allow for any serious conclusions
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Figure 4.12: Results from Experiment 6. A. ROC curves for each condition. B.
Estimates of recollection for each condition plotted as a function of estimates of
familiarity (d
(s)
k − d(n)k ) for each condition.
regarding its locus.
Figure 4.13 shows familiarity and recollection estimates from Experiments 1, 3,
5, and 6 (collapsed over match-mismatch conditions). There are two critical features
in the figure. First, comparing estimates from Experiment 5 with those from Exper-
iment 6 reveals that the list-length effect was only in the recollection parameter, as
predicted by the dual-process model. Second, the points from Experiment 6 do not
lie on the line that was able to be drawn through the data from Experiments 1, 3, and
5. There may exist a monotonically increasing line that can intersect the points from
all four experiments shown in Figure 4.13. This line, however, would require very
sharp curves (i.e., approaching non-monotonicity), and even then would just barely
include all of the 95% credible intervals.
The condition from Experiment 6 in which encoding was deep, participants were
forced to respond quickly, and the list length was short violates the pattern seen in all
other conditions. The importance of this single point, then, warrants close inspection.
Figure 4.14A shows estimates of recollection as a function of baseline strength for each
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Figure 4.13: DPSD estimates from Experiments 1, 3, 5, & 6. Estimates of recollection
for each condition are plotted as a function of estimates of familiarity, averaged across
match-mismatch conditions. The line is same function shown in Figure 4.11.
participant in this condition; Figure 4.14B shows recollection as a function of studied-
item familiarity. The relationship between recollection and baseline familiarity is
similar to that observed in Experiments 2 and 4. There is also, however, a negative
relationship between recollection and studied-item familiarity, whereas no relationship
between these estimates was observed in previous experiments. This relationship is
driven by about a dozen outliers, shown in gray in Figure 4.14B. The critical question
is what makes these participants different than all other participants observed thus
far.
Figure 4.14C shows response distributions for the outlying participants in Fig-
ure 4.14B, and Figure 4.14D shows distributions for non-outliers. Clearly, whereas
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most participants distributed responses across the confidence ratings, the outliers use
the “sure new” and “sure studied” responses almost exclusively. These data are ex-
tremely problematic for model fitting — they have only two degrees of freedom, and
so the ROC curve has only two points. An ROC with only two points can be per-
fectly accounted for by either of two models. First, an equal-variance signal-detection
model, which forms the familiarity component of the dual-process model, can account
for these data perfectly. Second, a simple all-or-none high-threshold model, by which
participants respond “sure studied” if they detect that an item was studied, and guess
“sure studied” or “sure new” if they don’t, can account for the data perfectly. As
a result, the dual-process model can account for these data perfectly in two ways:
1) by having no recollection and high familiarity (pure EVSD), or 2) by having high
recollection and no familiarity (high-threshold).
With two ways to perfectly account for the data (high recollection and no famil-
iarity, or vice versa), the model must choose one. If the DPSD model were being fit
separately to participants, then this choice would be a coin flip for each. In the hier-
archical model, however, participants who have extreme parameter values are pulled
in toward the group average for that parameter. In Experiment 6 the average value
of recollection across all participants is rather high, and so it is assumed that the
outlying participants also have high values of recollection. Accordingly, a model by
which these participants have no recollection but high familiarity is deemed implau-
sible. Instead, the hierarchical model allows these participants to have low values of
d
(s)
i , and assumes that they must have high values of recollection. Given the data
from all other participants, it is simply more plausible that these outliers have high
recollection and no familiarity than vice versa. In reality, however, the data for these
outliers give us no information regarding their levels of recollection or familiarity, and
so should not be considered as coming from the same group as the other participants.
The method for determining which participants are outliers is not obvious; perhaps
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Figure 4.14: Outlier Participants in Experiment 6. A. Participant effects on recollec-
tion (α
(r)
i ) as a function of those on baseline familiarity (α
(n)
i ). B. Participant effects
on recollection (α
(r)
i ) as a function of those on studied familiarity (α
(s)
i ). Points in
gray are driving the negative correlation, which is not observed in other experiments.
C. Distribution of confidence ratings for those participants driving the correlation
(drawn in red in B). D. Distribution of confidence ratings for all other participants.
one “believe” response is enough for the DPSD model to provide reasonable estimates;
perhaps several are necessary. To error on the side of caution, I considered participants
outliers if they responded “sure” 90% or more of the time. This criterion results in 23
outlier participants in Experiment 6, 14 in Experiment 5, 5 in Experiment 3, and 2 in
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Figure 4.15: Estimates of recollection & familiarity from model fits to data excluding
participants who only used the “sure” responses. A. Points are the same as in Fig-
ure 4.13, but without outlying participants. B. Same as A, but data are not averaged
over match-mismatch condition, and recollection estimates are drawn on probit scale
(Φ−1(R)). The line is the best-fitting unweighted least-squares regression line.
Experiment 1. The hierarchical DPSD model was fit to the data from the remaining
participants in each of these four experiments. Estimates of recollection as a function
of familiarity from these analyses are shown in Figure 4.15A. Clearly, considering only
those participants who’s data are rich enough for model fitting, the results across three
experiments, with four conditions in each, are perfectly in line with a single-process
explanation of recognition memory. Figure 4.15B shows these estimates for every
condition (i.e., not averaged over match-mismatch), with recollection plotted on the
probit scale. It appears that the underlying relationship between recollection and
familiarity may be linear in this space.
4.7 Discussion
The goal in Chapter 4 was to determine whether parameters of the dual-process signal
detection model could be selectively influenced. In Experiment 2, it was shown that
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a response-bias manipulation indeed affects only criteria parameters. Although the
effect of a levels-of-processing manipulation in Experiments 3, 5, and 6 manifested
mostly as an effect in recollection (as predicted), there was also evidence for a smaller
but consistent effect of LOP in familiarity. Speeding responses (Experiments 5 &
6) had a large effect on recollection (as predicted), but again had a sizable effect on
familiarity estimates as well. In Experiments 3, 4a-c, 5, and 6, the effect of perceptual
match-mismatch was exceedingly small or non-existent, even though several of these
experiments were specifically designed to increase the effect. Although it has been
claimed that the effect of perceptual match-mismatch affects only familiarity (Gregg
& Gardiner, 1994; Yonelinas, 2002), we failed repeatedly to find a sizable enough
effect to warrant such a claim. Moreover, other researchers have also failed to find
a match-mismatch effect (Boldini et al., 2004; Mulligan et al., 2010), and it is likely
that the few cases where an effect is found represent a selection bias to publish non-
null effects. If such small effects are partitioned into different processes, such as
recollection and familiarity, the resulting minuscule effects in each parameter can not
be used to claim selective influence. Thus, our results cast serious doubt on the claim
that perceptual match-mismatch selectively influences familiarity. Accordingly, there
exists no convincing demonstration of a manipulation affecting familiarity and not
recollection, or vice versa.
The effects of LOP, match-mismatch, and response speed all manifested as effects
in both recollection and familiarity. At first glance, however, the effect of list length
under a response deadline appeared to be only in recollection. Upon closer inspection,
in this condition several participants adopted a response strategy whereby they used
only the outermost response options. If such data are plotted in ROC space, the curve
would consist of only two points. Consequently, these data are perfectly explained
with either a pure EVSD model, or a pure high-threshold model. When these data
are fit with the dual-process model, the prior structure on recollection and familiarity
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determines whether these participants have all recollection and no familiarity, or
all familiarity and no recollection. Because such estimates certainly do not reflect
the processes of interest, data from these participants should not be considered in
analysis. When the dual-process model is fit to data for participants who used the
inner confidence ratings at least 10% of the time, then every manipulation considered
affected both recollection and familiarity. Moreover, the recollection familiarity space
is clearly reducible to one dimension (see Figure 4.15).
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Chapter 5
Summary and Concluding Remarks
The goal of this dissertation was to explore the processes underlying recognition
memory using hierarchical Bayesian models. In this final chapter I review the extent
to which this goal was met.
In Chapter 1 I showed how averaging data over people or items that vary in
their mnemonic processes underlying recognition memory judgments could distort
conclusions. In particular, if items that vary in d′ are averaged over, then data
from an equal-variance signal detection model will produce asymmetric ROC curves.
This asymmetry would be confounded with the mnemonic process, for example, by
interpreting the amount of item variability (asymmetry) as a measure of explicit
recollection.
In Chapter 2 I introduced a hierarchical unequal-variance signal detection model.
This UVSD model explicitly accounts for both participant and item variability, thus
circumventing any need to average data over participants or items. Application of
this model to a large confidence-rating experiment revealed that ROC asymmetry
remained even after partialling out variability due to participants and items. This
result was incongruent with the prediction from Chapter 1 because items and par-
ticipants do not simply vary in d′, but rather, exhibit nearly the same amount of
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variability in baseline strength and studied strength. This result, and several others,
could not have been obtained without the hierarchical model. Moreover, even though
asymmetry does reflect mnemonic process, averaging data over participants or items
still resulted in incorrect estimates, and confidence intervals on those estimates that
were biased too small. The result is that analyses utilizing averaged data will provide
far too much confidence in distorted results.
In Chapter 3, I developed an extended version of the hierarchical UVSD model
that allowed for participant and item variability in σ2. Fitting this model to Ex-
periment 1 revealed that σ2 does indeed vary across participants and items. This
variability, however, was systematic such that increases in sensitivity d′ were corre-
lated with increases in ROC asymmetry σ2. This structure was accounted for with
a simple gamma signal detection model that, by assuming mnemonic strengths were
distributed as gamma distributions that differed in scale, predicted a relationship
between sensitivity and asymmetry without the need for any more parameters than
EVSD. A hierarchical version of the Yonelinas dual-process model was also developed
which allowed participant and item variability in both recollection and familiarity.
Fitting this model to Experiment 1 revealed similar patterns as the UVSD fit —
recollection and familiarity were positively correlated across people and items. The
abilities of these models to account for Experiment 1, taking parsimony into account,
were compared via DIC. This analysis provided strong support for the dual-process
model over all single-process competitors considered.
In Chapter 4 I assessed whether parameters of the dual-process model could be
selectively influenced. In addition to relying on item-averaged data, previous studies
claiming selective influence are wrought with methodological flaws. In Experiment 2,
manipulations that were intended to affect participants’ response biases for certain
confidence ratings over others properly affected DPSD criteria, but not recollection
or familiarity. Six additional experiments were conducted in an effort to affect rec-
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ollection and familiarity independently. Across these six experiments, the effect of
perceptual match-mismatch was too small to be useful for making any claims about
selective influence. Thus, it seems that there is no manipulation that affects familiar-
ity without affecting recollection. In Experiments 3, 5, and 6, a levels-of-processing
manipulation was found to affect both recollection and familiarity, although in each
case there was more evidence for an effect in recollection than familiarity, as pre-
dicted. Comparing experiments in which participants were forced to make confidence
judgments within a small response window with experiments that had no time con-
straints revealed that the effect of response-deadline was in both recollection and
familiarity. Finally, under speeded conditions, the effect of study list length was
also in both recollection and familiarity. Thus, considering manipulations of match-
mismatch, levels-of-processing, response deadline, and list length, neither recollection
nor familiarity were able to be influenced in isolation.
In addition to assessing selective influence, the results from Chapter 4 allowed
for an assessment of the dimensionality underlying recognition memory. If a single
process is generating the data, then estimates of recollection and familiarity should
be correlated across all constructs. In particular, a plot of recollection as a function of
familiarity should be able to be reduced to one dimension by drawing a monotonically-
increasing line through all data points. Figure 4.15A shows recollection estimates as
a function of familiarity estimates from Experiments 1, 3, 5, and 6. Clearly, the
two dimensions of recollection and familiarity may be reduced to one. Moreover,
Figure 4.15B shows that the relationship between familiarity and the probit transform
of recollection may be a simple linear function.
The dual-process model provided a superior fit to the data, taking model com-
plexity into account, in two experiments (Exp. 1 & 3) according to the DIC statistic.
However, fits of the DPSD model clearly suggest that the data are generated from
a one-process model. There are two possible reasons for this discrepancy. First, the
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DIC statistic performs well when comparing two models that have similar numbers of
parameters, such as DPSD and UVSD with a different σ2 for each person and item.
DIC is a hierarchical extension of AIC, and like AIC, it is biased to toward more
complex models. It may therefor not be well-suited for comparing models that differ
greatly in their complexity, such as the DPSD and gamma signal detection models.
The second possibility is that there exists a single-process model that provides a bet-
ter account of the data than the DPSD model, but that is was not considered it in the
model comparisons in Chapter 3. Interesting candidates include the gamma signal
detection model with a shape other than 2.0, and other non-normal signal detec-
tion models such as the Gumbel (DeCarlo, 1998). Alternatively, non-signal detection
accounts such as mixture models (Broder & Schutz, 2009) may prove promising.
In conclusion, all of the data collected herein are perfectly compatible with a single-
process interpretation of recognition memory, including the effects of items, people,
levels-of-processing, perceptual match-mismatch, and slow vs. speeded responding.
There is therefore no convincing evidence that recognition memory is mediated by
two processes. It is my hope that until such evidence is presented, this model will
cease being used to interpret data from both normal and clinical populations. These
are important pursuits, but the current trend is to construct theories based on fits
of the dual-process model. If this model is wrong, as a close inspection of the data
suggests it is, then the field of memory will make little progress until it is abandoned.
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